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The Louisiana Civil Code provisions concerning error were recast in
the 1984 revision of the titles addressing "Obligations In General" and
"Conventional Obligations Or Contracts."' This article examines the revised
legislation on error and the corresponding appellate decisions rendered since
its enactment.2 Because the courts have not yet considered the entirety of
the issues litigated under the former legislation, discussion includes several
pre-revision decisions involving principles retained in the revised Civil
Code.
This article also examines the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts concerning the topic of mistake and compares them to their Louisiana
counterparts. The possible utility of Restatement approaches for Louisiana
courts and of Louisiana approaches for courts of other states is considered as
well.
The term mistaken assumption is used to describe a situation where at least
one of the contracting parties has an erroneous belief as to the circumstances
existing when the agreement is made, but both parties mutually understand all
express provisions of their contract. Misunderstanding refers to a situation where
the contracting parties have significantly different perceptions concerning the
contractual commitments or other legal consequences to result from their
transaction. This distinction has been utilized productively in several studies.3
It differentiates situations involving a core of agreement from those in which
legal commitment can be recognized only by selecting the perceptions of one
party over those of the other.
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law.
I. The revised titles consist of Articles 1756-2057. The provisions concerning conventional
obligations or contracts include five articles treating error as a concept applicable to contracts in
general. These articles, numbered 1948-52, are set forth infra in the text following note 4. The
revision was a project of the Louisiana State Law Institute. Professor Sadl Litvinoff, Boyd Professor
of Law, Louisiana State University and Director, Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, was the reporter.
2. The legislation, Act 331 of 1984, became effective on January 1, 1985.
3. See, e.g., George . Palmer, Mistake and Unjust Enrichment (1962); Edward H. Rabin, A
Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 Tex. L
Rev. 1273 (1967); George E. Palmer, The Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and
Reformation Under the Restatement of Contracts Second, 65 Mich. L Rev. 33 (1966).
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II. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLES ADDRESSING ERROR
The present Louisiana Civil Code contains five articles addressing error as
a concept applicable to contractual obligations in general. Included among the
provisions concerning "Vices of Consent," these articles provide:
Art. 1948. Vitiated consent
Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress.
Art. 1949. Error vitiates consent
Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which
the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known
or should have been known to the other party.
Art. 1950. Error that concerns cause
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the
contract, or the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial
quality of that thing, or the person or the qualities of the other party, or
the law, or any other circumstance that the parties regarded, or should
in good faith have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.
Art. 1951. Other party willing to perform
A party may not avail himself of his error if the other party is
willing to perform the contract as intended by the party in error.
Art. 1952. Rescission; liability for damages
A party who obtains rescission on grounds of his own error is liable
for the loss thereby sustained by the other party unless the latter knew
or should have known of the error.
The court may refuse rescission when the effectiveprotection of the
other party's interest requires that the contract be upheld. In that case,
a reasonable compensation for the loss he has sustained may be granted
to the party to whom rescission is refused.
A. Article 1949
Article 1949 is a logical starting point for an examination of these
provisions. If, as Article 1948 states, the consent requisite for contractual
commitment is undermined by error, it is essential to limit the error having this
vitiating effect. Accordingly, Article 1949 permits rescission only when the error
in question concerns "a cause without which the obligation would not have been
incurred." The provision further requires that the complaining party's "cause"
have been known or reasonably have been knowable by the party resisting
rescission. A revision comment states that the term cause is used in accordance
with its Civil Code definition to identify "the reason [a party] consented to bind
4. The five articles on error constitute the first of the four sections contained in the chapter
entitled "Vices Of Consent." The remaining sections address fraud, duress, and lesion.
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himself."' The comment further asserts that Article 1949's requirements are
"consistent with... the jurisprudential interpretation" of the article's antecedent
in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.6 In this light, it appears that cause, as used
in Article 1949, signifies an assumption that was integral to a party's expression
of legal commitment and that such an assumption is legally significant only if
its existence was known or should have been known by the other party.'
There is then the question whether every erroneous "but for" assumption of
a complaining party provides basis for rescission if his opponent knew or should
have known of the assumption and its significance. Although the word formula
suggests that such an awareness would provide basis for rescission in all
instances, a revision comment indicates that the party seeking rescission
sometimes bears the risk of inaccuracy of his beliefs. A comment to Article
1950 refers to a concept of error as to "motive" in which error having a
"decisive influence" on the decision to enter a transaction is nonetheless without
legal significance! In support of this proposition, the comment quotes the
French jurist Henri Capitant:
[A]n error which does not affect the manifestation of will remains
inoperative. That is the reason why an error in the motive does not
annul the contract even though it exerts a decisive influence on the
obligation. A buyer who buys a horse because he erroneously believes
that his own has perished.., would not have contracted had he been
correctly informed; nevertheless the sale [is] nonetheless valid.
Although the motives rest in the subjective sphere of the individual,
they no doubt prompt him to engage himself, but they nevertheless,
remain beyond the contractual field, they are anterior to the act of will
by which the party obligates himself; they are not a constitutive element
of the act of will.9
5. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 cmt. (c) (1984). Cause is defined in the first sentence of Louisiana
Civil Code article 1967. See infra note 225.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 cmt. (c) (1984). The counterpart provision of the Civil Code of
1870, Article 1826, provided: "No error in the motive can invalidate a contract, unless the other
party was apprised that it was the principal cause of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the
transaction it must be presumed that he knew it." The article's requirement that the party resisting
rescission have known or have had basis for knowing of the other party's belief was applied by the
appellate courts in nearly all situations involving mistaken assumptions and misunderstandings. See
George L Bilbe, Mistaken Assumptions and Misunderstandings of Contracting Parties-Louisiana
Legislation and Jurisprudence, 44 La. L. Rev. 885, 900, 943-47 (1984).
In contrast, in revision comment (f) to Article 1950, "motive" is used restrictively to identify a
category of error that does not undermine the consent requisite for contractual commitment. That
comment is discussed infra in the text following note 7.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 cmt. (c) (1984). For a careful examination of the various issues
addressed in terms of cause in Louisiana law, see Sadl Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48
La. L Rev. 3 (1987).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1950 cmt. (f.
9. Id.
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Under the view expressed in the comment, a party's consent is not
undermined by his erroneous assumption concerning his need for an item having
all attributes he believed it to have. Such an assumption, without more, does not
require recognition of error as to cause under Article 1949. Rescission is
available only if the complaining party can demonstrate additional factors making
it appropriate to condition the transaction upon the accuracy of his assumption.
B. Article 1950 and Its Antecedents
In light of Article 1949's provision, rescission seems limited to situations
where the party seeking to uphold the agreement knew or should have known of
the assumption that proved erroneous. However, an examination of Article 1950
suggests that there are atypical situations where the party in error should be
afforded protection even though the party seeking judicial enforcement had little
or no basis for detecting the assumption at issue. All of the categories of error
enumeratedin Article 1950 were recognizedin the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
as instances where error might preclude or vitiate consent.'" Further, a revision
comment asserts that Article 1950 "restates principles" contained in the 1870
enactment and "does not change the law."" Accordingly, these antecedents
should be considered in construing Article 1950 and in determining its
relationship to Article 1949.
1. Error as to the Nature of the Contract
In the case of error as to the nature of the contract, the highly unlikely
situation where the parties contemplate different generic contracts, the antecedent
legislation provides that "[e]rror as to the nature of the contract will render it
void."'" In an illustration, the former article describes a situation where, owing
to "error or ambiguity," one party believes he has purchased, while the other
believes he has pledged.'3 The provision states that the transaction does not
result in a contract.'4 There is no express requirement that the party resisting
the recognition of the legal relationship perceived by the other have had a
10. The Civil Code of 1870 identified categories of error as to "motive," "person" "nature,"
"object," and "law." Error as to object included error as to "substance," "substantial quality," and
"other qualities ... as were the principal cause of making the contract." See La. Civ. Code arts.
1819-46 (1870) (West comp. ed. 1972).
11. La. Civ. Code art 1950 cmt. (a).
12. La. Civ. Code art. 1841 (1870):
Error as to the nature of the contract will render it void.
The nature of the contract is that which characterizes the obligation which it creates.
Thus, if the party receives property, and from error or ambiguity in the words accompany-
ing the delivery, believes that he has purchased, while he who delivers intends only to





reasonable basis for his own perceptions. Further, the jurisprudence concerning
this article includes decisions indicating that error as to the nature of a contract,
apart from its reasonableness, precludes the recognition of contractual commit-
ment."
2. Error as to the Contractual Object
Article 1950's next category is error as to "the thing that is the contractual
object." Under the jurisprudence construing the counterpart provision contained
in the Civil Code of 1870, such error encompassed misunderstandings as to the
identity of items to be sold or otherwise affected. 6 The pre-revision jurispru-
dence included at least one decision in which such a misunderstanding was said
to prevent the recognition of a contract without regard to the reasonableness of
the parties' respective perceptions.'
7
3. Error as to a Substantial Quality
Article 1950 also refers to error as to "a substantial quality" of a contractual
object. Prior to the revision, the Civil Code identified error as to "the"
substantial quality of an object as an assumption providing basis for rescission.
Under the pertinent provision," "the substantial quality of the object" was the
quality that gave the object "its greatest value." The former legislation further
provided that a "contract relative to a vase, supposed to be gold, is void, if it be
only plated with that metal." It was unclear whether an assumption as to the
existence of an attribute could affect an object's substantial quality if the party
resisting rescission lacked a reasonable basis for realizing that the assumption
was being made.' 9 However, another article of the Civil Code of 1870
concerning error as to "the substance" of a thing permits rescission when an
object "supposed by one or both the parties to be an ingot of silver ... really is
a mass of some other metal that resembles silver., 20
15. See, eg., Williams v. Robinson, 98 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) and Bilbe, supra
note 6, at 937-43, 947.
16. See, eg., Berard's Heirs v. Berard, 2 La. 1 (1830); Lawrence v. Mount Zion Baptist
Church, 1 La. App. 404 (On. 1925); Patterson v. Koops, 10 Teiss. 266 (La. App. 1913).
17. See Lawrence v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, 1 La. App. 404 (Orl. 1925).
18. La. Civ. Code art. 1844 (1870) (as amended by Acts 1871, No. 87):
The error bears on the substantial quality of the object, when such quality is that which
gives it its greatest value. A contract relative to a vase, supposed to be gold, is void, if
it be only plated with that metal.
19. Id.
20. (Emphasis added). Article 1843 of the Civil Code of 1870 provides in its entirety:
There is error as to the substance, when the object is of a totally different nature from
that which is intended. Thus, if the object of the stipulation be supposed by one or both
the parties to be an ingot of silver, and it really is a mass of some other metal that
resembles silver, there is an error bearing on the substance of the object.
1999]
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If the erroneous belief of one party suffices for rescission in ingot
transactions, it seems questionable that a shared assumption would be necessary
for relief in the case of an erroneous belief as to the material from which a vase
is crafted. However, in an ingot sale, eachparty normally is aware that the other
is making an assumption concerning the composition of the metal and that this
assumption is crucial to the decision to enter the transaction. Further, if parties
have different assumptions concerning an ingot's composition, one of them very
probably is aware that the other is mistaken. In contrast, there are situations
where the material from which a vase is crafted reasonably would be regarded
as a matter of little or no importance. For instance, if informed buyers would
pay the seller's price with full awareness of the item's composition, the seller
could assert convincingly that he did not realize that the buyer regarded the
item's composition to be significant. Thus, there is question whether Article
1950's reference to error as to substantial quality was intended to encompass
situations where a party resisting rescission lacked reasonable basis for realizing
that the assumption was being made. The revision comments do not directly
address this question. However, a comment to Article 1950 asserts that
rescission is available under that article only when the requirements of Article
1949 have been met,2' and Article 1950 contains no express reference to error
as to substance in its enumeration. In this light, it appears that the concept of
error as to substantial quality provides basis for rescission only when the
assumption at issue was known or should have been known by the party seeking
to uphold the transaction.
4. Error as to Person
Article 1950 next identifies error as to "the person or the qualities of the
other party" as occurrences that can result in error as to cause.22 A revision
comment states that "relief may be obtained when, intending to contract with a
certain person or a person of a certain quality or character, a party has given his
consent to a contract with a different person, or with a person who lacks the
intended quality or character."' The comment concludes by asserting that "the
person of the intended obligee" is presumed to be "the reason why the obligor
bound himself' when the contract is gratuitous.
24
In the case of gratuitous contracts, it is reasonable to permit rescission on the
basis of the donor's error as to the identity or attributes of the donee even in the
unlikely situation where the donee did not realize that the assumption was being
made. However, when onerous contracts are involved, a party who had no
reasonable basis for perceiving a mistake as to his identity or attributes can
21. Revision comment (g) to Article 1950 provides: "Relief for error under this Article may
be granted only when that error also meets the requirements of revised C.C. Art. 1949...
22. See supra text following note 4.




challenge the appropriateness of rescission at the instance of the complain-
ing party. Nonetheless, the Civil Code of 1870 identified at least one
situation where error as to person provided basis for relief despite the reasonable-
ness of the perceptions of the party resisting rescission. An article provided that
error as to person was "generally" not a basis for rescission in "onerous
contracts, such as sale, exchange, loan for interest, letting and hiring."2 The
next article referred to the existence of "exceptions" to this proposition and
provided:
If, from the nature of the onerous contract, it results that any
particular skill or quality be required in its execution, which the party
with whom the contract is made, is supposed to possess, then the
consideration of the person is presumed to be the principal cause, and
error as to the person invalidates the contract.26
In its only example, the provision describes a situation where a party seeking
the services of "an architect of great eminence" deals instead with "one of the
same name, who has little or no skill" and provides that the resulting agreement
is "void." '2 Because of the many subjective factors involved in the selection
of an architect,2 the example does little to determine the extent of the article's
"exception" to the "general" unavailability of rescission for error as to person in
onerous contracts. However, other articles of the Civil Code of 1870 concerning
"Personal, Heritable and Real Obligations" provide assistance in considering this
issue. Under these provisions, an obligation of a party to provide "labor, skill
or industry," is said to be "personal" as to the obligor in that his death
extinguishes his obligation to render the performance.29 The contract is also
personal as to the obligor because his performance cannot be delegated to another
25. La. Civ. Code art. 1836 (1870).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1837 (1870).
27. According to the French language text of Article 1831 of the Civil Code of 1825, the
counterpart of Article 1837 of the Civil Code of 1870, the party whose services were requested is
in fact an architect. See La. Civ. Code art. 1837 (1870); La. Civ. Code art. 1831 (1825) (West comp.
ed. 1972).
28. Id. Further, in the French language text of the counterpart provision of the Civil Code of
1825, the party of the same name has neither talent nor reputation.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1997 (1870) (West comp. ed. 1972) provides in pertinent part:
An obligation is strictly personal, when none but the obligee can enforce the
performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor.
It is heritable when the heirs and assigns of the one party may enforce the performance
against the heirs of the other.
Id. Article 2007:
All contracts for the hire of labor, skill or industry, without any distinction, whether
they can be as well performed by any other as by the obligor, unless there be some
special agreement to the contrary, are considered as personal on the part of the obligor,
but heritable on the part of the obligee.
Contracts of mandate and partnership are mutually personal.
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party without the consent of the obligee to whom the performance is owed.3"
Further, under the terms of the Civil Code of 1870, these concepts apply to
obligations that can be "as well performed by any other as by the obligor, unless
there be some special agreement to the contrary."'"
If the identity of a party has such significance once a contract has been
made, it probably is appropriate to accord identity a like significance when the
availability of rescission is at issue. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to regard
the former law as having permitted a party to rescind an agreement simply by
demonstrating that he contracted for services with one other than the person he
was seeking. This approach would subject a good faith party to rescission, even
in situations where he has changed his position as a consequence of the
agreement. The Civil Code of 1870 acknowledged this possibility and provided
that "if anything be done by the person thus employed, who was ignorant of the
mistake, a compensation, proportioned to his service, is due." '32
In light of this history and of the continuing availability of reliance damages
under present Article 1952,"3 it appears that the revision's concept of error as
to person permits rescission even when the party seeking enforcement of the
agreement had no reason to realize that he was being mistaken for another.
However, the language of Article 1949 arguably poses an obstacle to this view.
Under the text of this provision, the complaining party's assumption must have
been one that "was known or should have been known to the other party."
34
Further, as previously noted, a comment to Article 1950 states that relief is
available under the article's terms only when the requirements of Article 1949
have been met."5 A good faith party resisting rescission can assert convincingly
that he did not know that the complaining party assumed he was someone else.
If pressed, however, the party resisting rescission also might concede that the
complaining party believed he was transacting with the party with whom he
wanted to deal. If the sole purpose of Article 1949 were the protection of
reasonablybased contractual expectations, the mistaken assumption as to identity
should be regarded as unknown to the party resisting rescission, and the
agreement should be enforced. If, on the other hand, the drafters of the
provision were concerned also with situations where the recognition of a contract
would result in legal consequences radically different from those contemplated
by the complaining party, the party resisting rescission should be viewed as
having been aware of the complaining party's assumption.
30. If an obligation to perform services is classified as personal in the event of the obligor's
death, it is reasonable to assume that the obligee can assert the personal nature of the obligation if
performance is tendered by anyone other than the obligor.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2007 (1870) (emphasis added).
32. Id. art. 1837 (1870).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 38-48.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 21.
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5. Error as to Law and as to Any Other Circumstance
Article 1950's enumeration of legally significant categories of error
concludes by identifying erroneous assumptions as to "the law, or any other
circumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good faith have regarded, as
a cause of the obligation." '36 The express recognition of error of law as a
possible basis for rescission is in keeping with the provision of the Civil Code
of 1870."' In situations involving error of law or error as to "any other
circumstance" that the parties regarded or should have regarded as affecting
cause, rescission clearly is limited in accordancewith Article 1949's requirement
that the party resisting rescission have known or have had basis for knowing of
the assumption at issue."
C. Article 1952
1. The Relevance of Article 1952 to Articles 1949 and 1950
In identifying assumptions affecting cause, the first paragraph of Article
1952 must be considered. It requires a party who obtains rescission "on grounds
of his own error" to compensate the party resisting rescission for the "loss
thereby sustained" unless the "latter knew or should have known of the error." 39
As discussed earlier,4 Article 1949 limits rescission to situations where the
party resisting rescission knew or had basis for knowing of the existence of the
complaining party's assumption. Accordingly, with the exception of assumptions
that were known or knowable by the party resisting rescission, it is difficult to
envisage situations where a party could obtain rescission on the basis of "his own
error." However, Article 1950's categories of error as to the nature of the
contract and error as to the identity of the contractual object involve misunder-
standings that can be characterized as having stemmed from a party's "own
error." If one party reasonably regards the other to have consented to a specific
generic contract and the latter unreasonably believes that a different generic
contract was identified, the misunderstanding very probably precludes the
recognition of a contract defined in accordance with the perceptions of the more
reasonable party.41 A similar situation would exist if each party intended an
agreement with a different contractual object, but only one party had reason to
know that the other had a different intention. Also, if error as to person justifies
relief where the party resisting rescission lacked basis for realizing that his
36. See supra text following note 4.
37. Article 1846 of the Civil Code of 1870 expressly recognized error of law as a basis for
rescission. Article 1840 of the Civil Code of 1825 contained a nearly identical provision.
38. See supra text following note 4.
39. See supra text following note 4.
40. See supra text preceding note 5.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
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services were not being sought,42 the mistake as to identity readily can be
attributed to the other party.
In situations where one party is responsible for the misunderstanding that
prevents the recognition of a contractual relationship, he can be regarded as
having obtained rescission on the basis of "his own error." In these circumstanc-
es, Article 1952 should require this party to compensate the other for any
reasonable reliance. Because error as to the nature of the contract and error as
to the contractual object technically may be obstacles to contract formation,
however, it can be argued that these misunderstandings do not result in
agreements that might be rescinded.4 If this argument were accepted, Article
1952 nonetheless should be extended by analogy when the misunderstanding can
be attributed to one of the parties. Also, the Civil Code articles on detrimental
reliance and delict provide bases for responsibility where a change of position
can be attributed to the fault of the party resisting the recognition of contractual
commitment."
Whether Article 1952 was intended to have other areas of application is not
clear. A revision comment accompanying the article states: "Under this Article,
a party in error who obtains rescission is liable to the other party for the injury
to the latter's interest that the rescission may cause. Previously, when error has
been invoked, Louisiana courts have regarded the problem solely as one of
rescission vel non. ' 4' The comment then cites two appellate cases in which
contractors unsuccessfully sought rescission on the basis of their mistakes in the
formulation of bids. Consequently, the comment strongly implies that rescission
in such situations now will be available under Article 1952. To permit rescission
in such a situation seems inconsistent with Article 1949's requirement that the
party resisting rescission have known or have had basis for knowing of the
assumption on which rescission is based.4 6 The complaining party, of course,
can assert that the party resisting rescission should know that a bid normally is
believed to be sufficient to recoup all costs of performance and to provide a net
42. See supra text accompanying notes 22-35.
43. A number of French jurists have advocated a concept of erreur-obstacle in which certain
misunderstandings including error as to the nature of the contract and error as to the contractual
object are obstacles to contract formation. See Sail Litvinoff, "Error" in the Civil Law, in Essays
on the Civil Law of Obligations 230-34 (Joseph Dainow, ed., LSU Press 1969); Sail Litvinoff, Vices
of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1989).
Professor Litvinoff asserts that "there is no room in the Louisiana Civil Code for the doctrine of
erreur-obstacle, because of its careful enumeration of different categories of error, all of which are
just vices of consent and give rise to a nullity which is only relative." Id. at 10-1 1. Under this view,
reliance damages could be awarded under Article 1952 in cases where error as to the nature of a
contract or error as to a contractual object can be attributed to a party's "own error."
44. Civil Code article 1967, the provision concerning detrimental reliance, is quoted infra in
note 225. Delictual responsibility is addressed generally in Civil Code articles 2315-2324.2. Articles
2315, 2316, and 2323 are relevant in determining the significance of a contracting party's fault in
situations where error prevents the recognition of a contractual commitment.
45. See La. Civ. Code art. 1952 cmt. (b).
46. See supra text preceding note 5.
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return. However, as the revision comment notes, such assumptions have not been
recognized as grounds for rescission under the prior legislation. If it is possible
for them to be so regarded under the revised articles, it will be necessary to
develop criteria for differentiating the bidding errors that do and do not constitute
basis for relief. To date, the Louisiana appellate courts have not considered the
possible application of Article 1952 to such a controversy.
Much can be said for a scheme that would relieve a party from a financially
devastating contract while requiring him to compensate the other party for
reliance damages incurred as a consequence of the commitment. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, for instance, advocates this approach when the
enforcement of a contract would be "unconscionable."4 7 However, if Article
1949's knowledge requirement is no barrier to rescission in some situations
where services have been promised for less than their cost to the performing
party, parties logically will invoke Article 1952 as basis for rescission in other
circumstances where relief is doubtful under the requirements of Article 1949.
2. Fault as a Requisite for Responsibility
Article 1952 will present other issues requiring judicial attention. For
instance, it will be necessary to determine whether fault must be established in
order to impose responsibility for reliance damages when rescission is grounded
upon a party's own error. If Article 1952 were construed to permit rescission
in certain situations where relief would be unavailable under Articles 1949 and
1950, there would be no need in these circumstances to assess fault in determin-
ing responsibility for detrimental reliance. Instead, the situation should be
regarded as one in which rescission is extended to a party otherwise unentitled
to relief on the condition that he compensate the other party for his detriment.
In contrast, where there has been error as to the nature of the contract or
error as to the identity of the contractual object, fault is the appropriate basis for
determining responsibility for reliance damages. In these circumstances,
misunderstandings have prevented any agreement in fact. Further, Articles 1949
and 1950 very probably preclude the recognition of a contract defined in
accordance with the intentions of the party whose perceptions were better based.
Accordingly, fault is the only basis for requiring one party to compensate the
other for the adverse consequences of their misunderstanding."
The case of error as to the person presents a situation where it is probably
appropriate to permit reliance damages without confirming the culpability of the
party asserting the error. In this atypical situation, it seems sufficient that the
party seeking compensation for his reliance reasonably believed his services to
47. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153(a) (1981).
48. If a contracting party can be regarded as having expressed the "promise" the other party
reasonably perceived him to have made, responsibility can be recognized in accordance with the
promisee's perceptions under the Civil Code's detrimental reliance provision, Article 1967. See
supra notes 42-44, 225, 427-429 and accompanying text.
1999]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
be sought when he changed position as a consequence of the complaining party's
expression of agreement.
3. Monetary Awards in Lieu of Rescission
The second paragraph of Article 1952 authorizes a monetary award not to
temper the impact of rescission but to compensate a party denied rescission
because "the effective protection of the other party's interest requires that the
contract be upheld."49 A revision comment describes a situation where a money
judgment appropriately might be granted to a party to whom rescission is
denied:
[I]f through error a party conveyed to another a piece of property
different from the one he intended to sell, and the transferee then built
valuable improvements upon the property, it would seem that the
transferee could be protected only by upholding the contract. If the
property actually conveyed was considerably more valuable than the one
intended, however, the transferee would obtain a great advantage if this
were done. In such a case, an award of reasonable compensation to the
transferor would insure a fair solution."
In this example, a good faith party's construction upon property he
reasonablybelieved he had purchased is identified as justification for denying the
rescission that otherwise would be available as a consequence of the misunder-
standing. The comment provides no further guidance concerning instances where
monetary adjustments, as opposed to rescission, might be appropriate. It seems
reasonable, however, to regard the article as basis for such an award in any
instance where the totality of the circumstances compels a decision to deny the
rescission to which a party otherwise would be entitled.
Furthermore, because Article 1952 was designed to enhance judicial
discretion in the formulation of remedies, its second paragraph possibly could be
regarded as basis for adjusting the terms of an agreement that could not be
rescinded under the other error provisions. However, it is unlikely that the
article was intended to provide the possibility of imposing a cost upon the
enforcement of contracts that have been enforceable under pre-revision law and
that continue to be protected from rescission under present Articles 1949 and
1950. Thus, even if Article 1952's first paragraph were construed to permit
rescission in situations where relief cannot be justified under any other article,
application of the second paragraph very probably would be limited to situations
where rescission would be granted under Articles 1949 and 1950 in the absence
of the atypical circumstances.
49. See supra text following note 4.




Finally, Article 1951 should be mentioned. It provides that "[a] party may
not avail himself of his error if the other party is willing to perform the contract
as intended by the party in error." This provision clearly affirms what
hopefully would have been ruled in its absence and precludes a contrary
contention that the parties' misunderstanding prevents the recognition of a
contractual relationship.
m. MISTAKE UNDER THE REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
Chapter six of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts [hereinafter the
Restatement] concerns the significance of mistakes made by contracting
parties. Mistake is defined in Section 151 as "a belief that is not in
accord with the facts." The comment to the section emphasizes that the
concept of mistake is limited to mistaken beliefs as to "facts as they exist
at the time of the making of the contract."'" Thus, the legal significance
of erroneous assumptions as to future circumstances is not determined
under the Restatement's provisions on mistake."Z The comment to the
section also asserts that "facts" include "law" in existence at the time of
the making of the contract. Accordingly, "[a] party's erroneous belief with
respect to the law, as found in statute, regulation, judicial decision, or
elsewhere, or with respect to the legal consequences of his acts," may
constitute mistake. 3
The chapter next addresses the mistakes that may make a contract "void-
able." Although the Restatement does not use the terms unilateral, mutual, or
common in identifying categories of mistake, it nonetheless differentiates "a
mistake of both parties" from "a mistake of one party" insofar as the require-
ments for rescission.54
A. Section 152
§ 152. When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was
made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is
voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the
mistake under the rule stated in § 154.
51. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 151 cmt. a (1981).
52. The Restatement analyzes erroneous assumptions as to future circumstances in terms of
impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose. Id. §§ 261-72.
53. Id. § 151 cmt. b.
54. Id. §§ 152, 153.
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(2) In determining whether the mistake has a material effect on the
agreed exchange of performances, account is taken of any relief by way
of reformation, restitution, or otherwise.
1. A Basic Assumption
The first of the three requirements for avoidance is that the mistake have
concerned a "basic assumption on which the contract was made." The comment
to the section states that the term "basic assumption" is used as it is employed
in the Restatement chapter on impracticability and frustration.55 Reference to
that chapter 6 indicates that the expression has the meaning that it has in
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a). In that provision, the term identifies
situations where the assumption of "the non-occurrence" of "a contingency" is
so fundamental that the duty to render the promised performance is modified or
discharged by the contingency's occurrence."8
Restatement sections 262-64 identify specific situations where the "non-
occurrence" of events may constitute basic assumptions. Death or incapacity of
a particular person, 9 destruction, deterioration, or failure to come into existence
of a thing necessary for performance,' and prevention by governmental
regulation or order' are recognized as contingencies that may result in
supervening impracticability. Additionally, Section 266 affirms that existing
impracticability or frustration may prevent a contractual duty from arising if the
nonexistence of the undetected circumstances is a basic assumption of the
agreement. The section's illustrations of such assumptions include situations
where: parties contract to sell machinery without awareness that it has been
destroyed by fire;62 a newly enacted zoning ordinance precludes the issuance of
55. Id. § 152 cmt. b.
56. Chapter 11 is entitled "Impracticability of Performance and Frustration of Purpose." The
term "basic assumption" appears in Sections 261-66.
57. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995):
Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
58. Id.
59. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 262 (1981).
60. Id. § 263.
61. Id. § 264.
62. Id. § 266 illus. I.
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a building permit a seller promises to procure for his buyer;63 and the invalidity
of a public bidding contract awarded to a general contractor prevents him from
affording a subcontractor the promised opportunity to perform work under their
subcontract.64
Section 152 includes six of its own illustrations of mistake as to a basic
assumption. The first involves circumstances closely analogous to Section 266's
example concerning the agreement to sell machinery that has been destroyed by
fire. In Section 152's illustration, parties contract for the conveyance of what
they believe to be timber land subsequent to a fire that has destroyed the
timber.65 In the next illustration, parties contract to convey land for a lump
sum "on the basis of the report of a surveyor," but the tract actually contains ten
per cent more acreage than the survey reveals." The next three illustrations
also involve situations where shared assumptions clearly have shaped the terms
of the transaction, parties agree to an assumption of a mortgage in circumstances
where the actual amount of the mortgage indebtedness is only a fraction of the
amount it is believed to be; 7 the parties to an agreement to assign indebtedness
secured by a mortgage mistakenly believe that a valuable building is located on
the mortgaged property; 6" parties agree to assign what is believed to be an
unsecured indebtedness of an insolvent party in circumstances where the
indebtedness actually is secured.69 In the final example, a party pays the
premium on an annuity contract based upon the life of a third person who is no
longer living when the premium is paid.7"
Section 152 contains no illustration of an assumption that should not be
classified as basic. However, the section's comment states that "market
conditions and the financial situation of the parties are ordinarily not such
assumptions."'M The comment continues: "[G]enerally, just as shifts in market
conditions or financial ability do not effect discharge under the rules governing
impracticability, mistakes as to market conditions or financial ability do not
justify avoidance under the rules governing mistake."72
In light of the foregoing sections, including their comments and illustrations,
it appears that assumptions are regarded as basic only if they significantly affect
the terms of the agreement. In Section 152's illustrations, the erroneous
assumptions resulted in contracts that otherwise would not have been made or
would have been made only with material adjustments to the terms of the
63. Id. illus. 2.
64. Id. illus. 3.
65. Id. § 152 illus. 1.
66. Id. illus. 2.
67. Id. illus. 3.
68. Id. illus. 4.
69. rd. illus. 5.
70. Id. illus. 6.




transaction. Additionally, the comment concerning the "general" insignificance
of assumptions as to market conditions and financial abilities emphasizes that
some shared assumptions provide no basis for rescission, even in situations where
the transaction would not have occurred in the absence of the mistake. Section
152 offers no further guidance concerning the differentiation of assumptions that
do and do not provide basis for rescission. The absence of any additional
direction can be explained in part by the difficulty' in specifying criteria
susceptible of general application. Further, the term basic, like the other inexact
expressions utilized in the chapter, is intended to facilitate judicial discretion in
effecting just allocations of risk.73 Finally, any concern that the term might be
construed to include assumptions that should not have legal significance is
largely negated by the existence of Section 152's further restrictions upon the
availability of rescission.
2. Material Effect on Agreed Exchange
Section 152 requires that the erroneous "basic assumption" have had a
"material effect on the agreed exchange of performances."' 4 The comment
relates that this test is not met by establishing that the agreement would not have
been made without the mistake. 5 Instead, a complaining party "must show that
the resulting imbalance in the agreed exchange is so severe that he can not fairly
be required to carry it out." 6 In determining whether the requisite materiality
exists, "the overall impact on both parties" is considered. 7 According to the
comment, assumptions having a material effect on an exchange normally cause
the exchange to be more advantageous to one party and less desirable to the
other. However, the comment further suggests that it is possible in "exceptional"
cases that the "adversely affected party may be able to show that the effect on
the agreed exchange has been material simply on the ground that the exchange
has become less desirable to him, even though there has been no effect on the
other party."" No example of such circumstances is given. The comment
asserts that "[c]ases of hardship that result in no advantage to the other party"
ordinarily should be analyzed in terms of impracticability and fiustration.7 '
3. Allocation of Risk
Even in situations where a basic assumption has had a material effect on an
agreed exchange of performances, Section 152 denies rescission if the complain-
73. Id. Introductory Note to Chapter 6 preceding § 151.
74. See supra text following note 54.







ing party bears the risk of the mistake under the principles outlined in Section
154. That provision will be discussed following an examination of Section 153.
B. Section 153
§ 153. When Mistake of One Party Makes a Contract Voidable
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a
basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect
on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the
contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake
under the rule stated in § 154, and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable, or
(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.
This section, like Section 152, requires that a legally significant mistake
involve a basic assumption, that it have a material effect on the agreed exchange
of performances, and that the risk of the mistake's occurrence not be borne by
the complaining party. In the language of the comment, a party seeking to avoid
a contract for "a mistake that he alone made ... must at least meet the same
requirements that he would have had to meet had both parties been mistaken.""
By imposing a requirement that the erroneous assumption be "basic," the
Restatement affirms the existence of judicial discretion in determining the
availability of rescission. Because discretion is also involved in assessing an
error's impact on an exchange of performances and in determining the existence
of unconscionability, it is unlikely that the outcome of a controversy would hinge
upon the classification of an assumption if unconscionability were alleged as
basis for avoidance. In instances where relief is sought through contention that
the opposing party had reason to know of a mistake, however, the availability of
rescission could depend solely upon a determination of whether an assumption
was basic.
The comment to Section 153 states that the "most common sorts" of
mistakes involving basic assumptions with material impacts "occur in bids on
construction projects and result from clerical errors in the computation of the
price or in the omission of component items."'" With the exception of
illustrations involving mistake as to the identity of a contracting party 2 and
misunderstanding as to the dimensions of land,83 all of the section's illustrations
80. Id. § 153 cmt. b.
81. Id.
82. Id. illus. 11-13.
83. Id. illus. 5.
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involve situations where a contractor has agreed to perform services or
construction for a price that would not recoup the cost of performance.
Unconscionability
Neither Section 153 nor its comment purports to define unconscionability;
however, the comment asserts that some of the standards outlined in the
comment to the Restatement section on unconscionability are similar to the
factors involved in Section 153 determinations." The referenced comment to
Section 208 relates that "gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an
important factor in a determination that a contract is unconscionable" 5 and that
such "a disparity may also corroborate indications of defects in the bargaining
process."86 Comment to Section 153 provides that the mistaken party "must
ordinarily show not only the position he would have been in had the facts been
as he believed them to be but also the position in which he finds himself as a
result of his mistake. 87 An examination of the illustrations indicates that
unconscionability can be recognized on the basis of the severity of the loss that
would result from contract enforcement. The first illustration involves a
contractor whose mistake in addition results in his submission of a bid for
$150,000 instead of the $200,000 figure that a correct calculation would have
produced.88 Performance for $150,000 would result in a $20,000 loss, and a
$30,000 profit would be earned with a $200,000 price. The illustration states
that the contract is voidable if "the court determines that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable."89 The next illustration is a variation of the
first in which the contractor, again as a consequence of a mistake in addition,
agrees to perform work for $150,000. In this situation, accurate addition would
have resulted in a bid of $185,000. Performance for $150,000 would result in
a loss of $5,000, and performance for $185,000 would yield a profit of $30,000.
The illustration concludes that the "court may reach a result contrary to that in
[the preceding illustration] on the ground that enforcement of the contract would
not be unconscionable, and hold that it is not voidable.""
The illustrationsalsorecognizethepossibilityofidentifyingunconscionability
in instances of significant misunderstandings. In one case, a buyer accepts a
seller's offer to sell land designated by a street address for $100,000 while
mistakenly believing "that this description includes an additional tract of land
worth $30,000."'" No information is provided concerning the market value of
84. Id. cmt. c.
85. Id. § 208 cmt. c.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 153 cmt. c.
88. Id. illus. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id. illus. 2.
91. Id. illus. 5.
[Vol. 59
GEORGE L. BILBE
the property actually owned by the seller, but the possibility ofunconscionability
is said to exist. Another illustration involves circumstancespatterned upon the
controversy in Raffles v. Wichelhaus.93 In this example, parties agree to the sale
of goods to be shipped ex steamerPeerless in circumstanceswhere only one of the
parties has reason to know that there are two steamers of that name with
significantly different sailing dates. After noting that Restatement section 20
permits the recognition of a contract defined in accordance with the perceptions
of the party without reason to know of the existence of two ships, the illustration
provides that such a contract is voidable if a court concludes that its enforcement
would be unconscionable.
The comment to Section 153 also addresses the role of reliance in unconscio-
nability determinations. It expressly states that reliance by the party resisting
rescission "may make enforcement of a contract proper although enforcement
would otherwise be unconscionable." 94 The discussion contrasts a situation
where rescission only deprives the party seeking enforcement of his expectation
interest and a situation involving "substantial" reliance where "avoidance may
leave that reliance uncompensated."95 Even in cases involving such reliance,
however, the comment asserts that avoidance should be available if a monetary
award adequately would compensate the party who relied upon the agreement. 96
In addition to instances of unconscionability, avoidance is available under
Section 153 in situations where the party resisting rescission "had reason to know
of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake."97 The comment emphasizes that
avoidance of a contract is available in these circumstances "regardless of whether
its enforcement would be unconscionable." ' The illustrations identify two
situations where a finder of fact could conclude that one party had reason to know
of the other's mistake. In one case, a property owner obtains ten bids ranging
between $180,000 and $200,000 and himself estimates $180,000 as the likely cost
of the construction.99 He thereafter accepts a bid of $150,000. The illustration
asserts that the discrepancy between the $150,000 bid and the ten other bids, as
well as the owner's own estimate, can justify a conclusion that the owner had
reason to know of the mistake and thus provide basis for avoidance of the contract.
In the other illustration, an option contract resulting from a general contractor's
ostensible reliance upon a subcontractor's bid in the formulation of his own
successful bid is said to be voidable if the general contractor had reason to know
of the subcontractor's mistake.1°°
92. Id. illus. 6.
93. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
94. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. d (1981).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra text following note 79.
98. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. e (1981).
99. Id. illus. 9.
100. Id. illus. 10.
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C. Section 154
Under both Sections 152 and 153, a party otherwise entitled to rescission is
denied relief if he bears the risk of the mistake in question. Section 154
addresses allocation of risk for the purposes of the preceding two sections.
§ 154. When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake
A party bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates
but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it
is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.
The comment concerning the first subsection states that a party may agree
"by appropriate language or other manifestations" to perform "in spite of mistake
that would otherwise justify his avoidance.""1"' An insurer's assumption of "the
risk of loss of property covered as of a date already past" is identified as an
instance of express risk undertaking.0 2 The sole illustration of allocation by
agreement concerns a contract to sell land in which the seller promises to convey
"only such title as he has."'0 3 Both buyer and seller, however, believe that the
seller has good title, and no title search has been performed on behalf of either
party. The seller makes no representation regarding his title. Despite the
existence of the shared assumption concerning the seller's title, the risk of
mistake is said to have been allocated to the buyer by the agreement of the
parties. Accordingly, the buyer is not entitled to relief if the title is found to be
defective.
Section 154's second basis for risk allocation concerns a party who, despite
awareness of his limited knowledge concerning circumstances as to which he
later claims mistake, "treats his limited knowledge as sufficient." The comment
states that an allocation is made pursuant to this provision only if the party
seeking rescission was "aware that his knowledge was limited but undertook to
perform in the face of that awareness."'°4  Beyond an assertion that these
situations involve "conscious ignorance," nothing is said to indicate whether such
an undertaking requires anything beyond an expression of contractual commit-
ment. The only illustration concerning this basis for allocation involves parties
who contracted to sell land "on the basis of the report of a surveyor."'0 5 Prior
to the making of the agreement, the seller proposed the inclusion of a provision
101. Id. § 154 crnt. b.
102. Id.
103. Id. illus. 1.
104. Id. cmt. c (emphasis added).
105. Id. iflus. 2.
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permitting an adversely affected party to "cancel the contract in the event of a
material error in the surveyor's report,"'" but the buyer refused to agree to
such a provision. The subsequent discovery that the property contains ten per
cent more acreage than the survey identifies is rejected as a basis for rescission
because the seller "bears the risk of the mistake."'
107
The section's final provision concerns risk allocation "by the court on the
ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.""' s The comment
explains the provision by asserting that there are situations where risks should be
allocated to a party for reasons other than those identified in the preceding
subsections.' °9
The comment suggests that a court, in making such a determination, "will
consider the purposes of the parties and will have recourse to its own general
knowledge of human behavior in bargain transactions. '  The comment's
single example and the section's four illustrations.. all involve situations
where the risk of mistake is allocated to the complaining party. Each situation
involves a setting in which courts generally have denied rescission. The
illustrations include both shared assumptions and a situation where the mistake
is made only by the complaining party. The comment asserts that refusals to
rescind agreements to sell farm land when "valuable mineral rights have newly
been found""' can be explained in terms of a judicial belief that this risk
should be borne by sellers. The first illustration concerns a complaining party
who supplies the premium for an annuity contractpayable to a third party during
the latter's life." 3 It subsequently is discovered that the third party, at the time
the contract was made, was "afflicted with an incurable fatal disease"" 4 and
was destined to die within the year. The parties to the contract are described as
having shared a belief that the third party was in good health with a normal life
expectancy. Nonetheless, the Restatement asserts that the appellate decisions
denying avoidance in similar circumstances reflect judicial determinations that
all pertinent factors, including precedent, justify risk allocations to the adversely
affected parties.
The next two illustrations are variations of illustrations in Restatement
section 266 concerning existing impracticability or frustration. Both of the
Section 154 illustrations involve builders who seek to avoid contracts because of
unanticipated difficulty and expense in rendering the promised performances. In
one situation, the problems can be overcome by utilizing "special equipment at
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. cmt. d.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. illus. 3-6.
112. Id. cmt. d.
113. Id. illus. 3.
114. Id.
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an additional cost of about twenty percent."' " In the other illustration, where
the builder has agreed to construct a house, he and the other party believe that
subsoil conditions are normal." 6 In fact, some of the land must be drained at
an expense that would leave the builder "no profit under the contract." In both
situations, the risk is allocated to the builder, and rescission, therefore, is
unavailable. Similarly, the final illustration rejects a builder's demand to be
relieved of a commitment resulting from a "mistaken estimate as to the amount
of labor required to do the work.... 7 The illustration is a variation of a Section
153 illustration concerning the existence of unconscionability where a builder
omits a substantial sum in totaling a column of figures. In the Section 153
illustration, '1 courts are directed to consider the possibility that unconscionabil-
ity exists. In the final illustration of Section 154, howeveri the mistake as to the
amount of labor necessary to perform the contract is identified as one that should
be allocated to the builder.
D. Sections 155 and 156
§ 155. When Mistake of Both Parties as to WrittenExpression Justifies
Reformation
Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole
or in part fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both
parties as to the contents or effect of the writing, the court may at the
request of a party reform the writing to express the agreement, except
to the extent that rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for
value will be unfairly affected.
§ 156. Mistake as to Contract Within the Statute of Frauds
If reformation of a writing is otherwise appropriate, it is not
precluded by the fact that the contract is within the Statute of Frauds.
Section 155 permits reformation only in situations where both parties are
mistaken as to the contents or effect of a writing. Reformation pursuant to this
section corrects mutual error made in the expression of an agreement and permits
the enforcement of the contract as it was intended by both parties. Accordingly,
even though an error made in reducing an agreement to writing can be regarded
as a mistake concerning a basic assumption, the possibility of rescission under
Section 152 will not be considered unless reformation is for some reason
precluded. As stated in Section 155's comment, "[o]ne party may ... seek
reformation in order to prevent avoidance by the other."'1 9
115. Id. illus. 4.
116. Id. illus. 5.
117. Id. illus. 6.
118. Id. § 153 illus. 1. The illustration is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 84-90.
119. Id. § 155 cmt. b.
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The comment also emphasizes that reformation is unavailable in instances
where parties correctly express an agreement that would not have been made in
the absence of a mistaken assumption of one or both parties. Because the
writing in such a situation accurately sets forth the agreement as it was made,
there is no basis for reformation, and the complaining party must seek a ground
for avoidance under Section 152 or 153.120 The comment also stresses that
reformation can occur only when there is a prior agreement to which the disputed
writing can be conformed. Further, the section's requirement of mutual error is
said to apply even in instances where one party knows that a writing does not
correctly express the preexisting agreement.' However, relief in this situation
is made available through the Restatement section on fraudulent misrepre-
sentation.12 Additionally, the comment to Section 155 notes that the parol
evidence rule is no bar to reformation under the terms of Restatement section
214.'2'
Section 156 affirms that reformation is available even though a contract
based upon the reformed writing will be within the Statute of Frauds. The
comment states that the "premise underlying the rule ... is that a writing
evidencing an agreement may be reformed ... before it is subjected to the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.""2 Accordingly, either the omission or
the misstatement of a term required by the statute is basis for reformation if both
parties were mistaken as to the writing's contents. The comment additionally
notes that reformation is precluded if the parties were aware that a
document did not include a term necessary to satisfy the statute." In
the corresponding illustration, parties who orally have agreed to sell land
sign a document they know to omit any reference to the agreed price.
Although neither party was aware of the consequences of the omission,
reformation will not be granted to incorporate a provision the parties knowingly
excluded.'26
E. Section 157
§ 157. Effect of Fault of Party Seeking Relief
A mistaken party's fault in failing to know or discover the facts
before making the contract does not bar him from avoidance or
reformation under the rules stated in this Chapter, unless his fault
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 166.
123. Id. § 155 cmt. a.
124. Id. § 156 cmt. a.
125. Id.
126. Id. illus. 4.
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The section affirms that rescission is not precluded by the failure to exercise
reasonable care in identifying the circumstances existing at the time of
contracting. Similarly, reformation is said to be available despite a complaining
party's failure to have read the document in dispute."2 These remedies are
foreclosed only when a party's fault can be characterized as "a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing."'M A
differentiation of the standards of care is provided through two of the section's
illustrations. The first refers to Section 153's illustration concerning the
contractor who, as a consequence of an error in addition, agrees to perform
construction for a sum that would result in a significant loss. 29 Section 157's
illustration asserts that the builder's negligence "in totalling and verifying his
figures" does not constitute "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing." Consequently, the courts are directed to
assess the assertion of unconscionabiity despite the complaining party's failure
to exercise reasonable care. The second illustration alters the first by having the
recipient of the bid request the builder to check his figures to ascertain whether
a mistake has been made.3 The builder falsely asserts that he has verified his
computations when "such a check would have revealed his mistake." After
receiving this assurance, the recipient accepts the bid. The builder's conduct is
said to involve a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing, and he, for that reason, is precluded from asserting
unconscionability.
F. Section 158
§ 158. Relief Including Restitution
(1) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, either
party may have a claim for relief including restitution under the rules
stated in §§ 240 and 376.
(2) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, if
those rules together with the rules stated in Chapter 16 will not avoid
injustice, the court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires
including protection of the parties' reliance interests.
The comment to the section asserts that each party to a contract "ideally"
would return the benefits he has received upon the avoidance of the agree-
ment. 3 ' Because the in specie return of a benefit received may be either
127. Id. § 157 crnt. b.
128. Id. cmt. a.
129. Id. illus. 1. Section 153's illustration I is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes
84-90.
130. Id. illus. 2.
131. Id. § 158 cmt. b.
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inappropriate or impossible, however, Section 158's first subsection permits
restitution through a monetary award made pursuant to Restatement section 376.
The first subsection also authorizes a contractual recovery pursuant to Restate-
ment section 240 where a party has completed a segment of his total performance
that is the agreed equivalent of a corresponding return performance. In this
situation, the latter performance will be enforced despite the avoidance of the
agreement.
The second subsection addresses situations where the first subsection's
provisions will not prevent injustice. Under the second provision, not only
Section 376, but also the entirety of Chapter 16, can be considered in an effort
to avoid injustice. Chapter 16 contains the Restatement's treatment of remedies,
including provisions on damages, specificperformanceandinjunction, restitution,
and preclusion by election and affirmance.' Much of this material has no
bearing upon the issues that may result from contract avoidance. However, the
chapter includes the section on reliance damages,' the sections concerning
specific performance,' 34 and the provisions complementing Section 376's
recognition of restitutory remedies in the case of rescission resulting from
mistake.'35 Accordingly, the reference to Chapter 16 in itself could be basis
for recognition of reliance claims and perhaps also for other remedies in addition
to restitution. However, the remainder of Section 158's provision obviates any
need to determine the extent of the remedies that might be justified solely by the
reference to Chapter 16. The section concludes by authorizing "relief on such
terms as justice requires including protection of the parties' reliance interests."
The comment affirms that the section authorizes recovery where factors
justify a decision to hold one party responsible for the other's detrimental
reliance.'36 The comment's only example of a reliance based recovery involves
a reference to an illustration to Section 153, the provision concerning mistakes
made by one party alone. In the referenced illustration, 3 ' a builder who has
contracted to perform construction for a sum significantly less than his costs
refuses to render performance. The property owner whose contract has been
repudiated then incurs reasonable expenses in obtaining bids from other builders.
The illustration refers to Section 158 and asserts that the contract may be found
unconscionable, despite the owner's expenditures, because a court can require the
builder to reimburse the owner for the expenses he has incurred.
The comment also asserts that the section permits a court "to 'sever' the
agreement [affected by mistake] and require that some unexecuted part of it be
performed on both sides, rather than to relieve both parties of all their du-
132. The chapter consists of Sections 344-85.
133. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 (1981).
134. Id. §§ 357-69.
135. Id. §§ 370-75, 377.
136. Id. § 158 cmt. b.
137. Id. § 153, illus. 8.
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ties."' The comment further suggests that courts should consider the
possibility of supplying "a term that is reasonable in the circumstances," if
rescission will not avoid injustice.' In an illustration to the section, parties
contract to sell land described as containing 100 acres, at a price of $100,000,
"calculated from the acreage at $1,000 an acre."'"4  Because the land actually
contains only 90 acres, the agreement is said to be voidable by the buyer under
Section 152 because of the material impact of the shared assumption upon the
agreed exchange of performances. According to the illustration, if the court
concludes that avoidance of the contract will not prevent injustice, it has
discretion to deny rescission and "to grant relief on such terms as justice
requires."'' Thus, if the court grants the buyer a $10,000 reduction in price,
he cannot obtain rescission on the basis of Section 152 because the price
adjustment corrects the imbalance in the exchange of performances.
The comment additionally asserts as a general proposition that a party who
has not been materially affected by a mistake should be allowed to assent to a
modification that eliminates the adverse effects of the mistake upon the other
party. 42 In the language of the comment, "[a] court may, under Subsection
(2), grant the party who has not been adversely affected what is, in effect, an
option to enforce the contract on new terms."' 43
Finally, the comment asserts that an exercise of discretion under subsection
(2) may be appropriate when both parties share responsibility for the mistake at
issue.'"
IV. THE LOUISIANA POST-REVISION JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING MISTAKEN
ASSUMPIONS
The Louisiana appellate courts do not differentiate mistaken assumptions and
misunderstandings. Instead, the courts analyze cases in both categories in terms
of a "principal cause" concept developed in applying the error provisions of the
Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870.' 4 Article 1826 of the Civil Code of 1870 and
its counterpart in the Civil Code of 1825 provide that "[n]o error in the motive
can invalidate a contract, unless the other party was apprised that it was the
principal cause of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the transaction it
must be presumed that he knew it."'" This provision was applied in almost
138. Id. § 158 cmt. c.
139. Id.
140. Id. illus. 1.
141. Id.
142. Id. cML. C.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Bilbe, supra note 6, at 900.




all cases where error was alleged to have legal significance. In nearly every
application, relief grounded upon error was held to be available only if the party
resisting rescission knew or should have known of the assumption that proved
erroneous.
147
As previously noted, 4 ' present Article 1949 provides that "[e]rror vitiates
consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would not
have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been known to the
other party." This formulation clearly retains the substance of the article's
antecedents, and the Louisiana State Law Institute's comments to present Articles
1949 and 1950 state that these provisions do not change the law.149 According-
ly, the courts have assessed error complaints asserted under the latter articles
pursuant to the analysis developed in the pre-revision cases.' However,
present Article 1949 refers to error as to cause instead of error as to principal
cause, and the post-revision decisions often refer to cause instead of principal
cause in determining whether erroneous assumptions are legally significant."'
The following post-revision decisions include discussions of the requisites for
rescission.
In the 1988 decision in Valiulis v. L'Atelier Wholesale Antiques, Ltd.,52
the Second Circuit concluded that pre-revision law technically was applicable to
an agreement entered before the revision's January 1, 1985, effective date.
However, the court asserted that application of the new articles would not affect
its analysis.'53 The controversy involved a buyer's demand to rescind the sale
of an antique armoire. The trial court concluded that the principal cause of the
contract was the acquisition of an armoire that would fit physically and
aesthetically in the office in which the seller knew the item would be placed."
Because the buyer was found to have proven that the armoire was too large to
fit aesthetically in the room in question, the trial court rescinded the sale. On
appeal, the Second Circuit emphasized that the trial court's decision could not
be affirmed unless the seller knew or should have known of the assumption
identified as a principal cause.'55 The appellate court found manifest error in
the trial court's conclusion that the seller had assured the buyer that the item
would fit aesthetically in his office. Although the seller had measured the
147. See Bilbe, supra note 6, at 900, 943-47.
148. See supra text preceding note 5.
149. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949 cmt. (a); id. art. 1950 cmt. (a).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 152-288.
151. See, eg., Woodard v. Felts, 573 So. 2d 1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Kethley v. Draughon
Bus. College, Inc., 535 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 216 and 229, respectively). Some decisions, such as Twin City Pontiac Inc. v. Pickett, 588
So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (discussed infra in text accompanying note 264), use the
expressions cause and principal cause interchangeably.
152. 519 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
153. Id. at 315 n.1.
154. Id. at 314.
155. Id. at 315.
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armoire and the wall identified by the buyer as the item's intended location, the
office space was then under construction, and no furniture was on the premises.
The buyer did not request the seller to view his other furniture, and he did not
request his interior decorators to advise him concerning the suitability of the
armoire prior to his purchase. The buyer did testify that he had been concerned
that there would be adequate space for the armoire and his other furniture, but
there was no testimony that he told the seller that he wanted his opinion
concerning the armoire's aesthetic suitability for the office." 6 The appellate
court concluded:
[W]e determine that the testimony, when contrasted with the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction, does not support the trial court's
determination that a principal cause of this contract has failed. The
circumstances simply do not fit the codal prerequisites for error as to
cause previously noted herein. It is our view that size was a cause only
in the sense that the parties understood that the armoire must physically
must fit in the office, rather than there being a guarantee that it was
aesthetically appropriate for the office. In other words, our view of the
record is that the plaintiff determined to purchase the item and was only
concerned that it physically fit into his office, which it did. 5
The court's resolution of the controversy was reasonably based. The buyer
did not bargain for an arrangement expressly permitting him to return the item
if he found it unsatisfactory, and the court of appeal concluded that the seller
made no representation upon which rescission could be granted. 5 In the
absence of other circumstances warranting relief, it is understandable to
emphasize that an assumption cannot provide basis for rescission unless its
existence was known or should have been known by the party seeking to uphold
the agreement. However, it seems unnecessary and possibly inaccurate to
characterize the buyer as having been concerned only that the item "physically
fit into his office.' 59 The armoire was a large expensive piece of furniture,
and the seller had visited the buyer's office to determine whether there was
sufficient space to display it in a prominent location identified by the buyer. In
these circumstances, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that the buyer believed
the armoire would complement the office and its furniture and furnishings.
Because the court believed rescission to be inappropriate, it was not inclined to
characterize the buyer's assumptions so that they arguably might have legal
significance. However, the concept of error as to cause does not require that an
assumption be recognized as a basis for rescission simply because its existence







including those involved in Valiulis, where the risk of inaccuracy of an
assumption should be allocated to the party seeking rescission even though the
party resisting rescission knew that the assumption was being made. 60
Bordelon v. Kopicki'61 and Smith v. Remodeling Service, Inc.' 62 involve
refusals of relief in circumstances where the parties resisting rescission neither
knew nor had basis for knowing of the assumptions at issue. In Bordelon, a
1988 decision of the Third Circuit, parties who had contracted to purchase a
residence situated on a comer lot refused to go forward with the transaction
when they discovered that a municipal right of way paralleling one of the
existing streets extended approximately thirty feet onto the property. Prior to
signing the agreement to purchase, the purchasers had made arrangements with
a contractor to have a bedroom added to the existing structure, but they never
advised the sellers of their intention to make this addition. The sellers were
aware that renovations were planned, but they had no knowledge of their nature
and extent. The trial court rendered a judgment for damages in favor of the
sellers despite the buyers' assertion that the agreement should be rescinded for
error. Emphasizing that a party must "either know or be presumed to know" of
an assumption before it can be identified as a principal cause, the Third Circuit
affirmed.'63 It observed that the record supported the buyers' contention that
they would not have contracted if they had known that a right of way thwarted
their construction plans. However, the court also emphasizedthat the record did
not indicate any basis for the sellers to have known that the enlargement of the
residence was the buyers' principal cause. The court observed:
From the nature of this transaction it cannot be presumed that the
plaintiffs knew what the [defendants'] principal cause was. The
apparent reason for agreeing to buy a house and lot is to acquire a
suitable place to live. The evidence establishes that the property in
dispute fit that description. We do not believe that the [plaintiffs]
should be held to have known that the [defendants] wanted to convert
the residence into a four bedroom home, and that their planned addition
would spill over into the right of way.'"
If the right of way had thwarted only the buyers' undisclosed construction
plans, it would have been reasonable to identify Article 1949's"6s knowledge
requirement as the basis for denying rescission. However, unlike zoning
ordinances or building restrictions, the right of way did more than preclude
construction. It also subjected the buyers to the risk that a thirty foot strip of
160. See infra note 379 and text accompanying notes 378-385.
161. 524 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
162. 648 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
163. Bordelon, 524 So. 2d at 848.
164. Id. at 849.
165. See supra text following note 4.
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
lawn might be lost through the widening of an existing street. Further, if the
controversy had been analyzed in terms of the significance of an undisclosed
nonapparent servitude, a contrary decision might well have been rendered.'
The Fifth Circuit's 1994 decision in Smith 67 involves a less controversial
application of Article 1949's knowledge requirement. The purchasers of a home
sought rescission and, alternatively, a reduction of price because the home's
"living area" was 2,054 square feet and not 2,547 square feet as they believed
it to be.'68 The trial court and the court of appeal rejected all contentions that
there had been misrepresentations as to the size of the living area by the seller
or by any party whose representations were imputable to him. However, the
record clearly established that the purchasers believed the house's living area to
be 2,547 square feet when they contracted to purchase and when they subse-
quently executed an act of sale. 69 The seller knew that 2,054 was the correct
living area and that 2,547 was the total area under roof including garages and
porches. 7 The buyers' belief concerning the size of the living area resulted
from an erroneous entry of the 2,547 figure as the living area in a real estate
publication. The entry had been made during a period when the seller had a
listing arrangement with a realtor. This listing was expired when the buyers and
the seller entered their agreement, and the appellate court concluded that there
was no evidence "to indicate that the seller knew or should have known that the
plaintiffs had bien misinformed about the living area.''. The court concluded
that the "plaintiffs' motive in purchasing the home was to acquire a suitable and
adequate place in which to live" and found that "the residence fit that purpose."
It accordingly affirmed the trial court's refusal to rescind the transaction.'
If the court properly concluded that the seller was not responsible for the
buyers' erroneous belief as to the square footage, the decision certainly was
correct. As a norm, sellers unquestionably are entitled to assume that buyers are
aware of the size of the structures they are purchasing. Further, the evidence
indicated that the home had a market value at least equal to the purchase
price. 3 Hence, the buyers' willingness to pay the agreed price did not suggest
the existence of their assumption concerning the living area of the property.
Accordingly, application of Article 1949 required that the buyers' claims be
rejected.
Interesting questions involving Article 1949 have arisen in disputes
concerning motor vehicles that were damaged in collisions and sold following
166. It could have been concluded that the sellers should have known that the buyers might be
unwilling to purchase residential property burdened by the servitude in question.
167. 648 So. 2d at 995.
168. Id. at 997-98.
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repair. In a 1987 decision regarding a pre-revision transaction, the Fifth Circuit
in Boteler v. Taquino I 4 cited Articles 1949 and 1950, as well as their anteced-
ents, in concluding that damage and repair unknown to both buyer and seller
provided no basis for rescission. According to the record, the buyer asked the
seller whether the automobile ever had been involved in an accident. The seller
responded that he recently had acquired the vehicle and that it, to his knowledge,
never had been wrecked. 17- The buyer thereafter purchased the car without
having it inspected. Within a week of the sale, he experienced mechanical
problems, and a mechanic, in the course of an examination of the vehicle,
discovered that it had been wrecked and repaired. Subsequent investigation
revealed that the car had been involved in two "major" accidents. Alleging the
continuing existence of a number of significant defects, the buyer brought an
action in redhibition. He also contended that the seller's representation that he
had no knowledge of an accident should be treated as an unequivocal assertion
that no wreck had occurred. Additionally, he sought relief based upon the
contention that he would not have purchased the vehicle if he had known of the
accidents.'7
Because the buyer had failed to introduce evidence of the defects he alleged
to exist, the court approved the trial court's denial of relief grounded upon
redhibition. Further, the court refused to equate the seller's truthful representa-
tion that he had no knowledge of an accident with a positive assertion that no
collision had occurred. The contention that error as to the occurrence of the
accidents provided basis for rescission was rejected without hesitation.
The court acknowledged the buyer's concern that the vehicle might have
remaining damage but concluded that proof of the collisions did not constitute
proof of existing defects. 17 The court also differentiated the situation from the
controversy in another appellate case where the seller knowingly sold a vehicle
that had been involved in a significant collision without divulging this informa-
tion.178 Finally, the court distinguished an appellate case involving the sale of
a demonstrator vehicle with less than three thousand miles by a dealer who knew
or should have known that the car had been wrecked. 79 The instant situation
was contrasted as the sale of a five year old automobile with substantial
odometer mileage by a party who had himself purchased for personal use and
who neither knew nor had reason to know the car's history. 0 In these
circumstances, the buyer's assumption that the car had not been wrecked, even
though known by the seller, was not regarded as basis for rescission."8
174. 517 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 379.
177. Id. at 378-80.
178. Wheat v. Boutte Auto Sales, 355 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
179. Danilson v. Crown Buick, Inc., 480 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).




Louisiana legislation requiring certain repaired vehicles to be designated as
"reconstructed" has led to interesting questions regarding Article 1949 cause
identifications. Under present law, a rebuilt "salvage"vehicle must be identified
as a "reconstructed"vehicle on the title certificate issued following its restoration
to operating condition.' A salvage vehicle is one purchased for salvage value
after it has been adjudged a total loss, and a total loss exists if there has
been damage equaling at least seventy-five percent of the vehicle's market
value.'
In 1989, in Lake Charles Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Stine," 4 the Third Circuit
considered a purchaser's contention that he was entitled to rescind the sale of a
"reconstructed" vehicle because he had been unaware of its classification at the
time of the transaction. The corporate seller, as its name suggests, was in the
automobile salvage business, and its employees had performed the repairs that
resulted in the car's "reconstructed" classification. The seller was never asked
whether the car was a "reconstructed" vehicle, and its representatives did not
volunteer this information.' However, the seller's representatives made no
effort to conceal the occurrence of repairs. The vehicle was being repaired when
it was first seen by members of the purchaser's family, and they were told that
it had been damaged in the right front and that repairs had included replacement
of the radiator and the air conditioning condenser.' 6 The existence of the
"reconstructed" designation was discovered after the vehicle had been delivered
to the buyer."7
The buyer contended that his assumption that the car was not a "reconstruct-
ed" vehicle should be identified as a principal cause because he would not have
purchased if he had known of the classification. 8 The court of appeal,
assuming arguendo that the buyer would not have purchased with knowledge of
the car's designation, rejected the claim to rescission in the absence of "any
evidence tending to show that the [seller] knew or should have known that this
was a principal cause for [the buyer's] entering into the sales agreement."'8 9
In the court's view, the seller should have understood the buyer's principal cause
to be the purchase of a "car... that was mechanically and structurally sound,
and reasonably safe to drive."'" Because the buyer failed to introduce any
evidence of the car's alleged shortcomings and the seller introduced "substantial
evidence... that the car was fully repaired and in good running condition," the
182. La. RS. 32:707(J)(2) (1989).
183. La. R1S. 32:702(11) (1989).
184. 539 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
185. Id. at 838-39.
186. Id. at 837.
187. Id. at 838.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 839.
190. Id. at 838.
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court concluded that the buyer had failed to prove any error affecting principal
cause.
191
The opinion is also of interest as it distinguishes the 1986 decision in
Cochran Ford, Inc. v. Copeland." In Cochran, the Second Circuit concluded
that successive sales of a "reconstructed" automobile were both subject to
rescissionbecause of error as to principal cause. All parties to the litigation were
automobile dealers.' 93 The most recent purchaser brought suit against its
vendor, and this individual asserted a like claim against the party who sold the
vehicle to him. In each transaction, the purchaser learned of the "reconstructed"
vehicle designation when the title certificate was furnished after the car's
delivery. The three year old automobile was sold for $5,500 in its last transfer
in 1984, and an expert witness testified that the presence of the designation on
the title certificate reduced the car's market value by $2,000 to $2,500.'94 The
Second Circuit concluded that there was error as to the principal cause from a
dealer's "standpoint because the reconstructed vehicle title decreased the car's
market value and thwarted the dealer's ability to resell the used car at a
profit."' 95 Accordingly, both sales were rescinded.
In Stine, the Third Circuit differentiated the Cochran case on two bases.
The court first noted that the record in the pending litigation contained no
evidence that the vehicle was purchased for resale or that its market value was
affected adversely by the "reconstructed" classification.'96 Additionally, the
court emphasized that the buyer, unlike the purchasers in Cochran, acquired the
vehicle from a salvage dealer."9
Both of. the court's bases for differentiation provide support for its
conclusion. However, the enactment of the statute requiring the identification of
"reconstructed" vehicles indicates a legislative intention to alert vehicle
purchasers of the occurrence of significant damage and reconstruction.
Accordingly, this legislation itself could provide justification for recognizing an
unknown "reconstructed" designation as basis for rescission under Article 1949.
However, in a situation where a purchaser is aware of significant reconstruction
but is unaware of the designation, there is little basis, apart from the statute
prescribing the designation, for decreeing rescission. There remains the
possibility that a vendor who reveals the occurrence of a collision might fail to
share information concerning the magnitude of the damage. The purchaser in
Stine, for instance, asserted but was unsuccessful in proving that he had been
misled as to the extent of the damage that had been repaired.' 98 Because such
191. Id.
192. 499 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
193. Id. at 512-13.
194. Id. at 510.
195. Id. at 512.





misrepresentations may occur and because a seller normally should be aware that
a purchaser might be unwilling to purchase a "reconstructed" vehicle, it would
be rational as a general rule to permit rescission in cases where a purchaser was
unaware that a vehicle had been "reconstructed."
On the other hand, in the situation presented in Stine, there was no proven
suppression of information unless the failure to reveal the "reconstructed"
designation is so regarded. Further, the court regarded the buyer's error as to the
existence of the vehicle's classificationas insufficient basis for rescission because
the vehicle was known to have been repaired by a salvage dealer. Similarly, the
absence of evidence indicating that the "reconstructed" classification diminished
the vehicle's market value certainly is relevant in determining the impact of the
buyer's error upon the price negotiated in the transaction. However, in view of
the statutory provision requiring the designation of the "reconstructed" condition
and the magnitude of the reconstruction requisite to this classification, it seems
preferable, as a norm, to regard the unknown status itself as basis for rescission.
In this light, the court's resolution in Stine seems better justified by the seller's
status as a salvage dealer than by the absence of any proof that the vehicle's
classification reduced its market value. Additionally, it should be remembered
that salvage dealers sometimes sell automobiles that are not salvage vehicles.
Accordingly, a buyer's awareness of a seller's identity as a salvage dealer need
not be regarded as a basis for denying rescission if an unknown "reconstructed"
designation generally is to be regarded as a ground for rescission.
In any event, under legislation enacted in 1995, rescission has been made
available whenever a transferor of a "reconstructed" motor vehicle fails to make
a written disclosure of its classification.'99 Accordingly, in situations involving
undisclosed "reconstructed" titles, it is no longer necessary to establish error as
to cause in order to obtain rescission.
The First Circuit's 1996 opinion in Franklin & Moore v. Gilsbar, Inc.2"°
discusses the requisites for rescission under Article 1949. In that case, a law
firm brought suit against an insurance broker for the sum paid in addition to the
premium originally remitted. The initial payment was made when the firm
exercised an option to purchase an extended reporting period endorsement on a
claims-made malpractice policy. The insurance broker originally quoted and
received a premium of $18,766. Thereafter, two days before the expiration date
of the original policy, the broker advised the firm that the premium had been
miscalculated, that the correct premium was $33,602, and that the immediate
payment of an additional $14,836 was necessary to effect the desired coverage.
The broker also advised that individual malpractice insurance applications of two
of the firm's attorneys could not be processed until the status of the firm's
extended reporting coverage was determined. The firm then paid the additional
199. See La. R.S. 32:706.103) (Supp. 1998) (added by 1995 La. Acts No. 848, § 1).
200. 673 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
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premium "under protest" and brought suit to recover the amount of the
payment.
201
The trial court found the broker's written quotations to constitute an offer
to secure coverage for the sum of $18,766 and the remittance of that amount to
be an acceptance obligating the broker to obtain coverage at the agreed price.
Although the trial court described the miscalculation of the premium as error
concerning the "principal cause" of the contract, it did not rescind the agreement.
Instead, it rendered judgment in the law firm's favor for the amount of its
additional payment plus interest. The trial court's oral reasons for judgment
were not transcribed in their entirety, and the court of appeal accordingly could
not ascertain the exact basis for the rejection of the broker's claim for rescission.
However, the appellate court readily inferred that the lower court had concluded
that the law firm neither knew nor should have known that "the specific premium
was a principal cause of the contract." 2 2 The court then observed that the
appeal did not involve factual disputes and turned its attention to the legal
significance of the broker's error in calculating the premium initially charged.
After quoting Articles 1949 and 1950, the court continued:
The jurisprudence has established the rule that a contract may be
invalidated for unilateral error as to a fact which was a principal cause
for making the contract, where the other party knew or should have
known it was a principal cause. (citations omitted) [The insurance
broker] admitted it made an error in quoting the premium for the firm's
ERP coverage and claimed this error concerned a principal cause,
without which it would not have agreed to provide coverage. The trial
court agreed. [The insurance broker] further argued because [the law
firm] knew or certainly should have known collection of the premium
was its principal reason for entering the contract, article 1949 is
applicable. (footnote omitted) This argument is disingenuous. [The
insurance broker] stated"collection of premium" was the principal cause
because anyone buying insurance would surely be expected to know
collection of premium was the insurer's primary reason for entering into
the agreement. But in fact, [the insurance broker] did not just want
collection of premium, [the insurance broker] wanted a specific
premium amount of $33,602; this was the principal cause of the
contract. If [the insurance broker] did not get that specific amount, it
was not willing to provide the coverage. But it could hardly expect [the
law firm] to know collection of $33,602 was the principal cause when
its own employee quoted a different amount-not once, but twice-not
just orally, but in writing ....203
201. Id. at 659-60.
202. Id. at 660.
203. Id. at 662.
1999]
LOUISIANA L,4WREVIEW
As additional support for its conclusion, the court noted the absence of
circumstances that might have alerted the law firm to the occurrence of the
broker's error. Further, in refusing to permit rescission on the basis of price
miscalculations not known or knowable by the party seeking to enforce the
agreement, the court ruled in accordance with the pre-revision jurisprudence.
In a number of cases involving mistakes made in the formulation of bids,
builders and other contractors consistently have been denied relief where they
made mistakes in mathematical calculation or in assessing the costs of rendering
performance.2 '
In every case where a party seeking to uphold an agreement had no
reasonable basis for detecting that the price determination was flawed, the error
was rejected as a ground for rescission. A contracting party's assumption that
his bid was sufficient to recover his costs and to provide a net return has never
been identified as a principal cause providing basis for rescission. As previously
discussed, there is basis for contending that present Article 1952 affords relief
in some circumstances where rescission could not be granted under the terms of
Articles 1949 and 1950.25 Article 1952 permits an award of damages to a
party seeking to uphold a contract when rescission is granted to the other party
on the basis of the latter's "own error." The courts' prior refusals to regard error
in price determination as basis for rescission, together with Article 1949's
requirement that the party resisting rescission know or have basis for knowing
of the assumption in question,2° strongly suggest that a party who makes an
error in price determination is not entitled to relief unless the other party knows
or should know of the error. However, The Louisiana State Law Institute's
comment to Article 1952 implies that contractors who have erred in their price
determinations are among those who might be granted rescission and held
responsible for reliance damages.' 7 The court of appeal, however, did not
consider the possible applicability of Article 1952 to the situation.
V. THE LOUISIANA POST-REVISION JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
In this article, the term misunderstanding describes a situation where
contracting parties have significantly different perceptions concerning the
contractual commitments or other legal consequences to result from their
transaction. The Louisiana appellate courts have utilized the revised legislation
in resolving several interesting controversies within this definition. Once
204. See, e-g., Cox-Hardie Co. v. Rabalais, 162 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Harris v.
Lillis, 24 So. 2d 689 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946); Reimann Constr. Co. v. Heinz, 17 La. App. 687, 137
So. 355 (Orl. 1931); Schorr v. Nosacka, 16 La. App. 20, 132 So. 524 (Orl. 1931).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
206. See supra text following note 4.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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more," 8 the courts do not differentiate mistaken assumptions and misunder-
standings.
In Progressive Bank and Trust Co. v. Vernon A. Guidry Contractors,
Inc.,2 9 a purchaser at a judicial sale brought suit to rescind the transaction
because the adjudication included only thirteen of the sixteen items he thought
he was purchasing. A total of sixteen items were offered for sale through three
separatesuits with identical parties and consecutive docket numbers. Prior to the
bidding on any of these assets, a deputy sheriffprovidedprospective bidders with
itemized lists identifying sixteen items to be offered for sale with their individual
and total appraised values. The list, which had been furnished by the seizing
creditor, did nothing to correlate the items with the particular law suits in which
they had been seized.2t0 According to the sheriff, he initially sold the single
item seized in the first numbered suit, then the two seized in the second, and
finally the thirteen from the third. In the third suit, the sheriff did not announce
that thirteen items were being sold. Instead, he read aloud all items to be sold.
He also announced that bids would be taken on each of the items individually
and then in globo and that the items would be sold either individually or in globo
depending upon the method resulting in the higher price. The sheriff
testified that, in each instance, he read the caption of the suit, the writ, and the
advertisement before the bidding began. He also expressed opinion that these
announcements clarified any misunderstanding that might have resulted from the
distribution of the list.
2t 2
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed the trial court and
rendered judgment in the purchaser's favor. In its opinion, the sheriff could not
distribute the list and then expect it to be disregarded. In the court's view, "[t]he
importance of the visual must not be underestimated,"particularly during lengthy
readings when "attentions are likely to falter" and "bidders are not always able
to hear or understand clearly what is being read., 2'3 Accordingly, the sheriff
was regarded as having contributed significantly to the buyer's belief as to the
identity of the goods being sold, and the court readily concluded that rescission
was available. It stated:
It is clear that there was no meeting of the minds on the thing sold, and
therefore a sale was never perfected.
2t4
Viewed from another perspective, [the purchaser] was in error
regarding the object of the contract. Error vitiates consent, and
consequently gives grounds for nullity, "only when it concerns the cause
without which the obligation would not have been incurred and that
208. See Bilbe, supra note 6, at 900.
209. 504 So. 2d 997 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987).
210. Id. at 998-1000.






cause was known or should have been known to the other party." LSA-
C.C. art. 1949. Error as to the thing that is the object of the contract
is error to a cause.21
In 1991, in Woodard v. Felts,216 the Second Circuit overturned a judgment
that had recognized a contract despite the defendant's contention that he had not
intended to incur a contractual commitment. The plaintiff, a forester, asserted
that he had been engaged to provide the professional services needed in
marketing the defendant's standing timber. In his view, the defendant had
authorized him to select the trees to be cut, to estimate the yield of the projected
harvest, to solicit bids from prospective purchasers, and to oversee logging
operations in the event of a sale.21 The defendant, a seventy-five year old
land owner without previous experience in such transactions, testified that he had
intended only to authorize the plaintiff to prepare an estimate of the quantity of
merchantable timber located on the property. Consistent with this assertion, he,
unbeknownst to the plaintiff, had consulted another forester concerning provision
of the services the plaintiff intended to perform. The defendant's intention was
to contract with the forester whose estimate indicated the existence of the larger
quantity of timber.2 Nonetheless, the defendant admitted that he had autho-
rized the plaintiff to mark all of the trees that were to be harvested. 9
The court of appeal identified two bases for reversing the trial court's
decision recognizing the existence and breach of a contract defined in accordance
with the forester's expectations. First, the appellate court concluded that the
forester did not satisfy the evidentiary requirements for proving the contract at
issue.uo Although it approved the lower court's determination that the dispute
concerned the provision of services and not the sale of standing timber, it
disagreed with the finding that the alleged agreement, involving more than five
hundred dollars, had been "proved by at least one witness and other corroborat-
ing circumstances. " 22' The court of appeal acknowledged that a party to an
agreement can be the "one witness" required by Article 1846, but ruled
that the requisite "corroborating circumstances may not be the result of the
plaintiff's own actions." 2  On this basis, the court rejected the plaintiff's
215. Id.
216. 573 So. 2d 1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
217. Id. at 1314.
218. Id.
2M9. Id. at 1316.
220. Id. at 1315.
221. Id. La. Civ. Code art. 1846:
When a writing is not required by law, a contract not reduced to writing, for a price or,
in the absence of a price, for a value not in excess of five hundred dollars may be proved
by competent evidence.
If the price or value is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved
by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.
222. Woodard, 573 So. 2d at 1315.
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contention that his marking of defendant's trees fulfilled the statutory
requirement.
Additionally, the appellate court found that there was no "meeting of the
minds." It expressed its opinion that the "actions of eachparty subsequent to the
first meeting [of the parties] are entirely consistent with each party's perception
of the agreement between them, but totally inconsistent with a completed
contract."'' The parties' misunderstanding also was described as "error as to
the cause of the contract which vitiated consent" under Articles 1949 and
1950.224
Despite the identification of alternative bases for denying recognition of the
contract perceived by the forester, the court recognized a recovery in his favor
on the basis of detrimental reliance. Citing Civil Code article 1967' as
authority, the court commented upon its options in formulating a remedy:
The court may grant either specific performance or damages. The
timber has already been cut and sold so that damages in [sic] the only
appropriate remedy available to the disappointed promisee. Damages
are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of
which he has been deprived. (citation omitted) However, the court need
not award both of these elements of damages, but may limit recovery
to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the
promisee's reliance on the promise. 226
The court's decision is noteworthy for several reasons. First, research has
revealed no other appellate decision permitting recovery under Article 1967 in
circumstances where the complaining party failed to satisfy the evidentiary
requirements for proving the existence of a contract." If the court's position
becomes accepted in the case of oral contracts requiring "corroborating
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1316.
225. La. Civ. Code art. 1967:
Cause is the reason why a person obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
226. Woodard, 573 So. 2d at 1316.
227. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19 (La. 1995) is the most recent case on point. In that
decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the writing requirement of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:8-319(a), for the sale of investment securities precluded recovery for detrimental reliance
upon an oral promise made prior to the effective date of Louisiana Civil Code article 1967. The
court ruled that a legislatively imposed "form requirement" foreclosed the possibility of a reliance
based recovery. Id. at 25. However, it noted that the enactment of Article 1967 might "alter this
analysis" but expressed "no opinion" whether the application of that article "would yield a different
result." Id. at 25 n.1 1.
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circumstances," similar arguments certainly will be advanced concerning
contracts that statutorily are required to be in writing.
The decision's discussion of the possibility of awarding expectation damages
is also of interest. It is doubtful that the court seriously considered awarding
such damages despite the existence of an unfulfilled evidentiary requirement.
Such an award would have exceeded the recovery needed to compensate the
forester for his reliance and would have rendered Article 1846's evidentiary
formalities meaningless.
It is also unlikely that the court seriously considered the possibility of
expectation damages notwithstanding the land owner's beliefthat no contractwas
being formed. Rendering such an award would have undermined the determina-
tion that a misunderstanding precluded the recognition of a contractual
relationship, and the court clearly believed that the land owner should not be
obligated contractually in accordance with the perceptions of the forester.
Nonetheless, the land owner admitted that he had authorized the forester to mark
the entirety of the trees to be severed, and the court concluded that this
authorization provided justification for the forester's belief that he had been
awarded a contract.28 In this situation, the court's recognition of a reliance
based recovery provided a reasonable accommodation of the interests of both
parties.
In Kethley v. Draughon Business College, Inc.,229 the litigants initially
believed that they had a legally enforceable agreement, but they subsequently
discovered that they disagreed as to the compensation to be paid for plaintiff's
services. Prior to the dispute giving rise to the litigation, plaintiff had taught a
course entitled Legal Research I in defendant's paralegal program for a
compensation of $200 per month. Thereafter, defendant's paralegal program
director asked plaintiff to teach Legal Research I and Legal Research H, which
were scheduled for different time periods, in the upcoming quarter. Plaintiff and
the director did not discuss compensation, but plaintiff testified that he believed
he would receive $200 per month per course because he had received $200 per
month for the course he had instructed." Subsequently, plaintiff was asked
to teach both classes during the same time period, and he acquiesced." He
taught both courses in this format until his first payday. Plaintiff assumed that
he would be paid $200 because the payday was the occasion for payment of one-
half of an employee's monthly compensation, and he believed he was being paid
$400 per month. However, he received only $100. After inquiry, plaintiff was
advised by defendant's academic director that he was teaching a "combined
class" and that he would receive the same amount for teaching both courses in
a combined format as he had received for teaching the single course in the prior
228. Woodard, 573 So. 2d at 1316.
229. 535 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).




quarter. 2  Plaintiff, in expressing his disagreement, emphasized that his
teaching involved two sets of student assignments, two sets of lectures, and the
teaching of two groups of students. 3  According to plaintiff, the academic
director then stated that she assumed that he would not continue under this
arrangement, and he did not reply. Plaintiff testified that he then consulted the
academic director's supervisor who, after promising to look into the matter,
communicated no further with him. Defendant appointed another instructor to
teach the courses, and plaintiff brought suit for $1,100, the difference between
the sum he thought he was going to be paid for teaching the entirety of both
courses and the $100 he actually received at the end of the first pay period.
Defendant denied that it had agreed to pay the plaintiff $200 per course per
month." 4 While admitting that plaintiff had been paid $200 per month for the
course he instructed during the previous period, defendant's academic director
denied telling him that the school paid $200 per course when he accepted his
initial appointment.' 5 The academic director also asserted that the school's
policy was to pay $200 per "contact hour" and explained that contact hours are
based upon the hours that an instructor actually spends in the classroom. 6
However, this witness acknowledgedthat she did not recall discussing this policy
with plaintiff. Further, she admitted that no one other than plaintiff's replace-
ment was teaching in a combined class format at the time of the trial. 7 It
also was established that all instructors who were teaching two sections of a
single course during different time periods were being paid $400 per month."
The trial court awarded plaintiff judgment for $1,100. The defendant,
contending that there was no "meeting of the minds" as to compensation,
appealed. 9 The court of appeal began its analysis by asserting that "[c]onsent
of the parties is necessary to form a contract," and by noting that the parties had
not discussed plaintiff's compensation for teaching in the combined class
format."' The court found the record to establish that the parties had intended
different rates of compensation. The court stated:
In a nutshell, it seems obvious that the plaintiff expected to receive
$400 per month (although he was teaching one-half the time originally
agreed to) because he was teaching two courses. It seems equally
obvious that the defendant planned to pay only $200 per month
(although the plaintiff was teaching two courses) because the class
(contact) hours were reduced by one-half.
232. Id. at 503-04.
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Clearly, there was no meeting of the minds as to the rate of
compensation, and any finding to the contrary which may be implicit in
the trial court opinion is clearly wrong.24
After finding that there was no contract to support the judgment rendered for
plaintiff, the court nonetheless found basis for an award in his favor. It noted
that defendant had "promised to employ the plaintiff to teach two courses" and
asserted that this promise resulted in "a reasonable expectation by the plaintiff
that he would receive more than he received for teaching one course. '242 On
this basis, the court concluded that plaintiff relied on a promise to his detriment
and that he was entitled to recover his damages under Article 1967.243 The
court concluded that he should be compensated for his efforts in preparing
research projects and lesson plans for his new course and for teaching both
courses for two weeks. Accordingly, the court awarded $500 for these activities
subject to a credit for the $100 sum he actually received.2"
In Franklin State Bank & Trust Company, Inc. v. Herring,24 the Second
Circuit considered competing assertions concerning the amount of a borrower's
indebtedness. The lender contended that the borrower had agreed to pay interest
at a variable rate of 2.5 points above the lender's "Prime" rate through 84 equal
fixed monthly payments together with any further monthly payments necessary
to extinguish idditional interest resulting from increases in the prime rate.2"
The borrower asserted that she understood her commitment to entail only the 84
payments she had made.247
The promissory note prepared by the lending bank provided that it was
"[p]ayable in 84 monthly payments of $239.98 including interest beginning June
5, 1983 and monthly thereafter until paid in full. 24 The note further provided
that interest at the rate of "FSB Prime + 2.5 per cent per annum" would be paid
from date on the principal sum of $13,160.24" Additionally, near the bottom
of the page, the note was stamped in ink over its pre-printed provisions. The
stamped provision was illegible in part. 0 Nonetheless, in the court of appeal's
opinion, it "suggest[ed] that something... about [the borrower's] obligation on
the note is 'SUBJECT TO CHANGE ON A DAILY BASIS."1' 251' The
borrowing was secured by a chattel mortgage that, in identifying the borrower's
indebtedness, described it as payable in 84 monthly payments. The disclosure
241. Id. at 506.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 225.
244. Kethley, 535 So. 2d at 507.
245. 608 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610 So. 2d 800 (1993).
246. Id. at 644.
247. Id. at 645.
248. Id. at 645.
249. Id. at 644-45.
250. Id. at 647.
251. Id. at 647-48.
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statement identified the annual percentage rate as "15.5" on one line and as "FSB
Prime + 2.5 %" on the line beneath. 52 The disclosure statement also described
the amount financed as the amount identified in the note and in the chattel
mortgage. However, it was blank as to the total of the payments to be made and
as to the total finance charge to be incurred in the absence of pre-payment." 3
The payment schedule on the disclosure statement described only the 84 equal
payments and contained no language referring to the possibility that additional
payments might be required. 4
The borrower testified that she was never told how the interest rate was to
be computed, and the only witness called by the bank had not been involved in
the transaction." Further, the bank offered no evidence to chronicle the
changes in its prime rate, and its witness failed to "explain how or by whom the
computation was made to determine that [the borrower] owed the bank $2,693.54
over and above the $20,158.32 she had paid over a seven-year period."" 6
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in the bank's favor
for the sum it alleged to be unpaid." The appellate decision neither reveals
the lower court's basis for its decision nor discusses the factors that might
provide support for the bank's position. In this regard, it is possible to read the
initial language of the note as calling for further monthly payments if the 84
monthly payments have not amortized the indebtedness." Additionally, the
note identifies a variable interest rate, and fixed sum payments will not service
a variable rate indebtedness fully while the interest rate is above the rate for
which the amortization payments are set. Further, the blanks in the financial
disclosure statement as to the total amount of payments and the total finance
charge support the bank's contention that the loan should have been understood
as a variable rate transaction.25 9
The court of appeal, however, believed that the borrower was justified in
regarding the transaction to require only 84 payments.26 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the bank's intention to enter a variable rate transaction did
not affect the borrower under the terms of Article 1949. In the court's view, the
borrower's expectations were entitled to protection unless she should have known
that the bank would not have lent the principal without a commitment to make
payments for a term that might exceed 84 months.26 ' Because the court was
252. Id. at 646.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 645.
256. Id. at 644.
257. Id. at 649.
258. The language "and monthly thereafter until paid in full" (Id. at 645) could be understood
to include payments that might be required in addition to the 84 monthly payments that unquestion-
ably were to be made.
259. Herring, 608 So. 2d at 646.




convinced that the borrower had been reasonable in perceiving repayment to
involve only an 84 month term, it reversed the lower court's judgment in the
lender's favor. In the appellate court's view, "the circumstances of this record
and the duration of the asserted 'error"' precluded the recognition of any
commitment beyond the making of 84 fixed payments.262 Additionally, the
court of appeal emphasized that the bank failed to establish that the borrower had
paid less than she would have owed under the rates the bank intended to
charge. 263
In Twin City Pontiac, Inc. v. Pickett,264 the Second Circuit considered a
dispute regarding the price in a sale of a motor vehicle. The buyer had paid the
entirety of the price specified in the contract document, and the seller had
marked the buyer's copy to indicate that full payment had been made. The buyer
provided the seller with keys to the trade-in vehicle, and he was given possession
of the new automobile. After his departure, a representative of the seller
discovered that its computation of the price involved a $2,000 subtraction error
in the buyer's favor.265 The seller testified that immediate efforts to contact
the buyer were unsuccessful but that its representatives were able to explain the
situation to him when he delivered the title certificate to the trade-in vehicle
three days later. The buyer admitted that the seller then explained its position
and made its demand that he either pay an additional $2,000 or rescind the
agreement. 66 The buyer, refusing to alter the transaction, put the signed title
certificate on a desk and left the seller's premises. Thereafter, the seller brought
suit for $2,000, the additional sum that allegedly would have been included in
the price but for the error in calculation.
The seller contended that the parties had agreed to a $19,442 cash price to
be reduced by a $1,000 manufacturer's rebate. The seller asserted that the
parties then agreed to assign a $2,700 value to the buyer's trade-in vehicle and
that both parties understood the pre-tax, pre-rebate price to be the remainder
resulting from the subtraction of $2,700 from $19,442. It was further alleged
that the salesman read the nine in the $19,442 figure to be a seven, and that he
accordingly calculated a pre-tax, pre-rebate price of $14,742 instead of the
$16,742 sum that accurate computation would have produced. There was further
testimony that this $14,742 sum was utilized by the seller's business manager,
who computed license fees, sales tax, applied the rebate, and sold the buyer a
service contract. 7
The buyer disputed the seller's account of the bargaining process. He denied
that he had agreed to use the $19,442 figure as the frame of reference in
determining the price to be paid for the vehicle. He also contended that he never
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 588 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
265. Id. at 1126.
266. Id. at 1128.
267. Id. at 1126.
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examined the computations on which the seller relied and that the only relevant
figure was the bottom line price including fees and taxes.268
The trial court concluded that the parties had agreed to use $19,442 as the
sum from which the trade-in allowance and the $1,000 rebate would be
deducted.26 The court of appeal expressed its understanding of the lower
court's determination:
The trial court apparently believed that [the buyer] was aware or
should have been aware of the error in light of the originally quoted
price of $19,442 and the subsequent discussions as to the value of his
trade-in. The trial court accepted as a fact, based upon his perception
of the credibility of the witnesses, that the $2,000 subtraction error
occurred after [the buyer] knew of and had agreed to the quoted price
of $19,442 less the rebate and trade-in allowance. We find no manifest
error in the trial court's factual determinations.270
Consistent with this conclusion, the trial court rendered judgment for the
$2,000 sum it found to have been omitted in the calculation of the price.
Because the buyer denied that he had expressed agreement utilizing the $19,442
figure, he contended that the transaction should be rescinded if it were not to be
upheld at the price he had paid. The trial court's finding that he either knew or
should have known of the omission of $2,000 from the agreed price, of course,
largely undermined any basis for rescinding the transfer of the vehicle. If the
buyer had actual knowledge of an arithmetical error, the transaction clearly
should be enforced in accordance with the terms of an accurate calculation. If,
on the other hand, it were concluded that the buyer lacked definite knowledge
of the mistake in calculation, rescission in some circumstances might be
appropriate despite the determination that the buyer had reason to know of the
situation. In this regard, the relative positions of the parties as professional and
consumer, the role of the dealer in the actual performance of the calculations,
and the magnitude of a $2,000 increment in price are factors that normally might
support a decision to decree rescission in lieu of a $2,000 augmentation of price.
However, because the seller had offered the buyer an opportunity to rescind the
transaction three days after its occurrence as an alternative to paying an
additional $2,000, it was reasonable to deny rescission at trial ten months later
when it was concluded that the buyer, at a minimum, had basis for realizing that
a mathematical error had been made.
Further, in the opinion of the majority, rescission in the instant case could
not be accomplished simply by returning the vehicle and restoring the purchase
price. Because the vehicle had been driven and its market value had diminished,
the majority asserted that a monetary adjustment in the seller's favor would be





necessary if rescission were decreed. 7 ' In light of this analysis, the majority
might have been expected to affirm the trial court's award on the basis of its
conclusion that the parties reached an agreement as to a specific sum to be
reduced by a rebate and a trade-in allowance. Under this reasoning, the $2,000
judgment in the seller's favor can be seen as an implicit reformation of the
signed document to reflect the price that would have resulted from an accurate
mathematical calculation.
Instead, the majority based its approval of the lower court's decision upon
Article 1952's second paragraph. 7 ' As previously observed, this provision
permits a court to "refuse rescission when the effective protection of the other
party's interest requires that the contract be upheld.' 7' The article additionally
provides that "a reasonable compensation for the loss he has sustained may be
granted to the party to whom rescission is refused."27 The majority analyzed
the situation as though the seller were seeking rescission of the transfer of the
vehicle. It asserted that rescission would require the buyer to compensate the
seller for ten months' use of the vehicle and expressed opinion that the value of
this use might well exceed $2,000. It then concluded that the "effective
protection of [the buyer's] interest requires that the contract be upheld" and that
the $2,000 award "represents a reasonable compensation for the loss sustained
by" the seller.
2 75
Because the seller was not seeking rescission, the applicability of Article
1952's second paragraph can be questioned. However, the article does authorize
a monetary adjustment to price in a situation where a transfer is upheld, and the
provision would have provided a clear basis for the court's affirmation of the
$2,000 award if rescission actually had been sought. Further, the buyer may
have preferred the payment of an additional $2,000 to rescission on terms
requiring a more costly adjustment for the diminution in the vehicle's value.
In Grace v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,276 the Fourth Circuit examined compet-
ing contentions as to the terms of an ostensible agreement. The plaintiff asserted
that the defendant had agreed to pay $150,000 to settle the former's maintenance
and cure claim. The defendant acknowledged that it had promised to pay this
sum. However, it contended that the payment was to be made not only for the
extinguishment of the claim for maintenance and cure but also for the plaintiff's
agreement to dismiss his appeal of a judgment in the defendant's favor on the
plaintiffs claim for negligence. The plaintiffs demand was based upon his
counsel's acceptance of a written proposal by defendant's attorney. The letter
in question described itself as an "offer" and stated that it would be "rescinded"
if not accepted by an identified hour and date. It also provided: "As you are
271. Id. at 1129.
272. Id. at 1128-29.
273. See supra text preceding note 49.
274. See supra text following note 4.
275. Id. at 1129.
276. 653 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
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aware, our client has offered to settle [plaintiff's] maintenance and cure into the
future for a total of $150,000.00[.] This offer has been 'on the table' since the
end of the trial on July 14, 1994."'2" Prior to the offer's expiration date,
defendant's counsel received a letter advising of plaintiff's acceptance of
defendant's "offer to settle... maintenance and cure into the future for a total
of $150,000. '"2'7
When it became apparent that the defendant would not make payment unless
the appeal was dismissed, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce settlement of the
maintenance and cure claim, only, for the sum of $150,000. The trial court
conducted a hearing that was limited primarily to argument of counsel.
However, the record included a letter written by plaintiff's counsel that supplied
some support for defendant's position. The letter was written six days after the
trial of the negligence action and forty-eight days before defendant's letter
offering to settle for $150,000. After outlining the estimated cost of future
maintenance and cure benefits and addressing defendant's responsibility for past
benefits, plaintiff's counsel continued: "After your client has paid [plaintiff] the
back due maintenance at the rate of an additional $15.00 per day I would like to
be notified of this development. Thereafter, we can further discuss settlement
of this case on the basis of a release of all claims for maintenance and cure as
well as an agreement not to file an appeal."2 9
The trial court rejected the plaintiff's demand. In the judge's view, the
defendant had intended to include the dismissal of the appeal in the settlement,
although his "letter didn't say that."2' ° Nonetheless, the court identified the
defendant's reference to the offer that had been "on the table" as a factor
supporting its conclusion that there was no "meeting of the minds. ' 28 ' A
majority of a five judge panel of the court of appeal reversed. In the majority's
view, there was no ambiguity in either the defendant's offer or the plaintiff's
acceptance. Accordingly, the exchange of communications was found to have
resulted in a "clear and explicit" contract with provisions leading "to no absurd
consequences." '282 Article 2046283 was then cited in support of the conclusion
that parol evidence as to the parties' intentions was inadmissible. Additionally,
the majority expressed opinion that the settlement was on terms that rationally
might have been agreed to by the defendant. It further asserted:
If [defendant's] $150,000 offer was predicated upon the condition that
[plaintiff] abandon his appeal of the judgment on the negligence claim,
277. Id. at 705.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 707 (Schott, CJ., dissenting).
280. Id. at 706.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. La. Civ. Code art. 2046:
When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences,
no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent.
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
it could and should have so stated. It did not. The offer, without the
condition, was acceptedwithin the allotted time, and [defendant] is now
bound. What [defendant's] attorney may have meant to include in the
offer, or what he wished he had included is irrelevant. Were we to hold
otherwise where the terms of the offer are clear and unambiguous, and
that offer is accepted, without modification by the offeree, no settlement
agreement would ever be final.2U
In separate opinions, the two dissenting judges expressed their view that the
matter should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. In the
words of one of the dissenters, the attorneys should be given an opportunity to
"testify under oath as to what they intended and what they thought they were
doing."'28S In this judge's view, Article 1949 would provide basis for denying
the existence of a contract if defendant could support its allegation "that the
obligation to pay the $150,000 would not have been incurred except for a
complete settlement of all claims and plaintiff knew or should have known
this."42 "1 The other dissenter believed that the defendant's description of its
offer as having been "on the table" since the trial was in itself basis for regarding
the proposal to include the appeal's dismissal. Accordingly, this judge concluded
that a remand was necessary only to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to
illustrate that defense counsel changed "his mind and his offer" between the time
of trial and the date of his offer of settlement.' 7
The decision is significant for two reasons. It illustrates the difficulty in
determining the reasonableness of the respective perceptions of contracting
parties, and it identifies the tension between the recognition of reasonably based
contractual expectations and the protection of parties whose consent has been
undermined by error. The majority's view is representative of a number of
Louisiana appellate decisions concerning situations where one party asserts an
understanding that is readily supported by the language of a contract document
and the other contends that he contemplated terms or consequences of which the
first party had little or no reason to know. 288 The relationship between the
parol evidence rule and the rules concerning the significance of vitiated consent
is a topic unto itself. Because the cases discussed in this article primarily
concern the revised articles on error, the impact of the parol evidence rule is
considered only tangentially.
284. Grace, 653 So. 2d at 706.
285. Id. at 707 (Schott, CJ., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id. (Waltzer, J., dissenting).
288. See, e-g., Baur v. Ciolino, 636 So. 2d 218 (La. 1994); Ardoin v. Central La. Elec. Co.,
318 So. 2d 5 (La. 1975); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Louisiana Minority, Inc., 522 So. 2d




VI. THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENTIAL CONCEPT OF INEXCUSABLE ERROR
The supreme court's majority opinion in the 1987 case of Scott v. Bank of
Coushatta"9 is probably the first Louisiana appellate decision expressly
identifying "inexcusable neglect" as the basis for denying a claim to rescission
grounded upon "unilateral error."2  The case concerned a lender's effort to
rescind a novation in order to enforce the commitment the novation had
extinguished. The initial obligation was evidenced by a promissory note. The
note was executed by parents in borrowing funds that were applied to the price
of an automobile purchased by their adult son. Approximately one year later, the
son decided to replace the vehicle, and the parents, who opposed the transaction,
insisted that he pay or otherwise discharge their obligation. After discussions
with the parents' lender, the son signed a new note for a sum in excess of the
principal owed on the first instrument. The lender required that this note be
signed also by the son's father, and the son, who agreed to procure his father's
signature, signed his father's name without the latter's knowledge or authoriza-
tion. The second note bore the lender's notation that it was executed to
extinguish the first note.29' The first note was marked "paid" by the lender and
was mailed to the parents.292 Nearly a year later, the lender notified the father
of the approaching maturity of the second note. In response to inquiry resulting
from this notice, the father learned of his son's activities.
Despite the father's assertions that he had not signed the second note and
that he had not authorized his son to do so, the bank sought judgment against
him on that instrument. It alternatively contended that the parents were liable on
the first note if the father had not been obligated through the second transaction.
The trial court found that the father had not signed the second instrument and
that he had not authorized his son to act on his behalf.293 The court also
concluded that the first note was discharged through the transaction involving the
second instrument and that the liability of the parents accordingly was extin-
guished.294 The court of appeal affirmed the conclusion that the father was not
obligated on the second note, but it rejected the lower court's conclusion that the
first note had been discharged through the execution of the second. In the
289. 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987).
290. The majority asserts that "error on the part of one party" cannot provide basis for rescission
if the error results from that party's "inexcusable neglect." Id. at 361. At another point in its
opinion, the majority states that the "Louisiana jurisprudence is sprinkled with cases which deny
relief.., because of unilateral error which is caused, in large part, by the complaining party's
inexcusable ignorance, neglect, or want of care." Id. at 362. Additionally, it is said that "Louisiana
cases have rejected the defense of unilateral error where the complaining party, through education
or experience, had the knowledge or expertise to easily rectify or discover the error complained of."
Id. at 363.
291. Id. at 358.
292. rd.




appellate court's view, the second note was a renewal instrument that posed no
obstacle to the enforcement of the initial obligation.295 Although the supreme
court was divided as to the ultimate enforceability of the first note, there were
no dissents from the majority's conclusion that the trial court correctly found the
lender to have agreed to a novation.296
The majority then turned attention to the lender's contention that the
novation should be rescinded because of its assumption that the second note had
been signed by the father as well as the son. After noting that a contract can be
rescinded for error or fraud under both the Civil Code of 1870 and the revision,
the opinion asserts that "error on the part of one party may not invalidate the
agreement if the cause of the error was the complaining party's inexcusable
neglect in discovering the error." '297 The first case cited in support of this
proposition was a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
That decision, Marsh Investment Corp. v. Langford,29 also involved a
bank's suit to enforce indebtedness notwithstanding a novation agreement. The
debtor had been sued on promissory notes she had executed to accommodate her
son. Thereafter, the bank agreed to dismiss the suit and to cancel the notes in
exchange for a new note to be executed by the son alone. This note was to be
made for the total of the mother's indebtedness and all additional indebtedness
owed to the bank by the son. It also was agreed that the instrument would be
secured by a mortgage on property owned by a third party. After the transaction
was executed, it was discovered that the son lacked authority to encumber the
third party's property. The bank sought to rescind the transaction based upon the
nonexistence of the contemplated security and the son's misrepresentations
concerning his authority to secure the indebtedness. 2 The mother contended
that the bank's negligence precluded rescission of the novation. °
The district court was unable to identify any Louisiana authority precisely
on point. However, it found support for its denial of rescission in the law of
redhibition and in the legislation and jurisprudence limiting rescission grounded
upon misrepresentation in situations where the complaining party could have
discerned the truth without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill.3"' In the
court's view, Louisiana's pre-revision law did not afford rescission to a purchaser
complaining of misrepresentations as to attributes of an item where he "had
every reasonable opportunity to become informed about the facts and has failed
to do so.""302 The court also expressed opinion that Louisiana law, as a general
295. Id.
296. Id. at 359-61.
297. Id. at 361.
298. 620 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. La. 1985).
299. Id. at 883.
300. Id.




proposition, requires a party seeking relief for fraud to "show a material
misrepresentation of fact upon which that party had 'a right to rely and actually
did rely."' 3  The court concluded that the bank failed to make "the slightest
inquiry into the nature, extent, and very existence" of the son's purported
authority to encumber the third party's property and found that the bank "dealt
with him at its risk. 3 °14 After concluding that the bank had failed show that
it had a right to rely on the son's representations or, in the case of certain of the
these representations, that there had been any reliance in fact, the court stated:
The Bank, schooled in financial dealings and fully assisted by counsel,
chose to proceed in ignorance in this matter. (citation omitted) Such a
conscious course of conduct under the suspicious circumstances of this
case may properly be characterized under Louisiana law as gross fault
or negligence. (footnote omitted) The result of the Bank's failure to
apprise itself of the facts behind [the son's] patent misrepresentations
can be laid at no doorstep except its own.
My decision to deny the Bank's claim against [the mother] remains
the same regardless of whether she is an innocent party in the restruc-
turing transaction or "the beneficiary of her agent's calculated fraud."
This case is dismissed not because [the mother's] defense succeeded, or
because the equities lie in her favor, but because the Bank failed to
establish its right to the relief requested. 5
Although the district court did not utilize the term "inexcusable" in describing
the bank's failure to scrutinize the son's purported authority to encumber the
property in question, it classified the bank's inactivity as "gross fault" and, in a
footnote, observed that the Civil Code defines gross fault as fault "which
proceeds from inexcusable negligence or ignorance." 3"
In addition to Marsh Investment Corp. v. Langford, the supreme court's
majority opinion in Scott identified several Louisiana state court decisions
involving situations where rescission was resisted on the basis of alleged fault of
the complaining party. Most of the cited decisions were first catalogued by
Professor Vernon V. Palmer in a 1975 article concerning "contractual negli-
303. Id. (quoting LaCroix v. Recknagel, 89 So. 2d 363, 367 (La. 1956)).
304. Id. at 885.
305. Id. at 885-86.
306. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(13) (1870) (West comp. ed. 1972) (redesignated as La. Civ. Code
art. 3506(13) in 1991 under authority of the Louisiana State Law Institute):
Fault.-There are in law three degrees of faults: the gross, the slight, and the very
slight fault.
The gross fault is that which proceeds from inexcusable negligence or ignorance; it is
considered as nearly equal to fraud.
The slight fault is that want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his business.




gence."3 °7 The majority, in line with Professor Palmer's view, asserted that the
"jurisprudence indicates two prominent factors in the evolution of the contractual
negligence defense:"
(a) Solemn agreements between contracting parties should not be upset
when the error at issue is unilateral, easily detectable, and could have
been rectified by a minimal amount of care.
(b) Louisiana courts appear reluctant to vitiate agreements when the
complaining party is, either through education or experience, in a
position which renders his claim of error particularly difficult to
rationalize, accept, or condone."'
Turning to the controversy at issue, the majority described the bank as
having been faced with a "sea of red flags" in its dealings with the defendants'
son. 9 The court observed: the bank permitted the note to be removed from
its offices for execution; it required no witnesses to the father's signature; both
signatures on the note appeared to be made in the same handwriting; the father's
signature card in the bank's possession indicated that the signature on the note
was not genuine; the questionable validity of the signature was not noted at the
time of the transaction; and no effort was made to consult the parents about the
genuineness of the signature or the son's authority to obligate his father.3 t
The majority concluded: "In short, these lax banking practices preclude the
Bank's now rescinding the novation.W
1
'
Three justices dissented. All of the dissenters agreed that the bank had
consented to a novation, but they also believed that the "lax banking practices"
were no bar to rescission under the circumstances revealed by the record. One
dissenting justice asserted, without elaboration, that the unauthorized signature
justified rescission "regardless" of the bank's conduct in the transaction."'
Another justice, who regarded the bank as having "negligently cancelled" the
note, contended that the negligence should have significance only if the parents
"suffered damages in reliance on" the cancellation. In this justice's view,
judgment should have been rendered in accordancewith the terms of the original
note in the absence of pToof of detrimental reliance resulting from the cancella-
tion."" Although the justice found no such proof in the record, he expressed
opinion that reliance damages "perhaps" should be regarded as basis for a pro
307. Vernon V. Palmer, Contractual Negligence In the Civil Law-The Evolution of a Defense
to Actions for Error, 50 Tul. L Rev. 1 (1975).
308. Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356, 362 (La. 1987).
309. Id. at 363.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 364 (Marcus, J., dissenting).




tanto reduction of the original indebtedness and not as justification for refusing
to rescind the novation" 5
The third dissenter stated:
Although I agree with most of the majority's statement of legal
precepts, I disagree with its articulation and application of a rule which
precludes rescission of an obligation based on error or fraud because of
a party's slight negligence....
Under previous Louisiana case law, as well as modem civilian
doctrine, in determining whether to grant rescission or, when rescission
is granted, whether to allow any recovery to the party not in error, the
court may consider whether the error was excusable or inexcusable.
(citations omitted) Under the Civil Code, inexcusable negligence or
ignorance is the source of gross fault, which is considered as nearly
equal to fraud. (citation omitted) The court may also consider whether
the other party has changed his position and the importance of such a
change. In this context, Louisiana courts have said that in case of doubt
as to error in the motive of one of the parties, courts will lean heavily
in favor of one seeking to avoid loss and against one seeking to obtain
a gain. (citation omitted)3t6
The justice noted that the bank had done business with the father and the son
on prior occasions and had no reason to question the son's honesty. The justice
then expressed his conclusion that the bank's conduct, even if it constituted
negligence, clearly did not involve "inexcusable error or gross fault." 7 To the
contrary, in a situation where the father had not "changed his position or suffered
damage" and the bank sought only to avoid loss, the bank's error was clearly
"excusable."318
Research has identified no further decisions of the supreme court addressing
excusable or inexcusable error. Several decisions of the courts of appeal,
however, have involved situations in which one party resisted rescission through
contention that the other's error was inexcusable. One of the most interesting is
the 1994 decision of the First Circuit in Massachusetts Indemnity & Life
Insurance Co. v. Humphreys.3t9
The controversy involved an insured who claimed proceeds under a rider to
a life insurance policy insuring her own life. The rider insured the life of the
insured's husband, who was known by both the insured and the insurer to have
leukemia at the time the application for the rider was made. According to the
315. Id. n.I.
316. Id. at 365 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. 644 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
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insurer, the insured and her husband were aware that the desired coverage could
be provided only if the husband's former wife, who also was an insured and who
had an existing rider insuring her former spouse's life, would consent to the
transfer of this rider from her policy to the policy of the insured.320 The
insured contended that she had been advised that coverage could be effected
without the necessity of the first wife's consent and that she only needed to
supply a copy of her husband's judgment of divorce and two policy change
forms executed in accordance with the insurer's instructions.32' One of these
forms, however, clearly had been prepared for the first wife's signature.3
Approximately two months after the submission of an application that did not
include the first wife's signature, a rider insuring the husband's life was received
by the insured. On the day after the receipt of the rider, an officer of the insurer
wrote the insured a letter asserting that the rider was "invalid and/or void from
the date of issuance."" The letter was accompanied by a check for the sum
submitted by the insured with the insurance application. Although the insured
had cashed the check, she made application for the proceeds of the rider after her
husband's death approximately five months later. The insurer initiated an action
for declaratoryjudgment to determine its responsibility. It asserted that the rider
was "issued through mistake and clerical error" and that this error provided basis
for relieving it of the commitments expressed in the document.324 It further
contended that any rights that might have existed as a consequence of the
issuance were extinguished through the negotiation of the refund check included
with the letter explaining the insurer's position.
2 5
The district court concluded that the insurer was obligated by the issuance of
the rider. .It also ruled, in light of the insurer's representations as to the
unenforceability of the rider, that the insured's negotiation of the check did not
constitute "a knowing and voluntary waiver."326 The court of appeal affirmed
these determinations. Addressing the contentionthatrescission should be available
because the transaction did not have the first spouse's approval, the court simply
stated: "[U]nilateral error does not vitiate consent if the cause of the error was the
complaining party's inexcusable neglect in discovering the error."327 Scott v.
Bank of Coushatta3 2' and a 1991 decision of the First Circuit were cited as
authority.329 The opinion included no further discussion of this issue.
320. Id. at 819.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 821. The quoted language is the trial court's characterization of the insurer's
communication.
324. Id. at 820.
325. Id. at 821.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 820.
328. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 356.
329. Woods v. Morgan City Lions Club, 588 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 335-346).
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If it is assumed that rescission would be available to the insurer under
Articles 1949 and 1950 in the absence of factors rendering the error "inexcus-
able," it appears that relief would be afforded under the reasoning of at least two
of the three justices who dissented in Scott. If, as one justice asserted,330 error
becomes inexcusable only if the party resisting rescission has relied upon the
transaction to his detriment, then the insurer's negligence should be no barrier
to a decision in its favor. The insured's husband had been diagnosed as having
a life threatening illness. Accordingly, his only prospect for obtaining significant
insurance coverage required his former wife to relinquish her rights to the rider
under which coverage already existed. There simply could not have been any
reliance in the sense of refraining from efforts to procure comparable coverage
through other insurers. Further, the insurer wrote the letter repudiating its
commitment on the day after the rider was received by the insured. Thus, it is
highly unlikely that the insured entered any transaction attributable to her belief
in the existence of coverage before she learned of the insurer's repudiation.
Under a concept in which error is "inexcusable" only if it results in detrimental
reliance, the insurer's negligence would not preclude rescission.
It also appears that the insurer's negligence would not bar rescission under
the view of the justice who would limit inexcusable error to error resulting from
"gross fault."33' Because the Civil Code provision equating inexcusable
negligence with gross fault also denominates the standard for actionable
negligence as "slight fault,"3 ' the justice reasoned that negligence not
involving gross fault should not preclude rescission. Additionally, this dissenter
asserted that the occurrence and extent of reliance should be considered in
determining whether error is inexcusable.333 Accordingly, rescission should be
available to the insurer under his analysis.
The insurer in the Humphreys case did not seek writs for the review of the
court of appeal's decision. The supreme court's decision in Scott, however, does
not compel the result reached in Humphreys. In the first place, the majority in
Scott expressly refers only to "unilateral error" and "error on the part of one
party"334 in describing circumstances where inexcusable error will preclude
rescission. In Humphreys, the insured should have been aware that coverage
would not be made available unless her husband's former spouse relinquished the
existing insurance on his life. Accordingly, it can be argued that the insured
should have known that the rider was issued on the assumption that the former
spouse had agreed to give up her rights. On that basis, the situation could be
characterized as one involving a shared assumption, and the concept of
inexcusable error, a preclusion described in terms of unilateral error, would be
inapplicable. Of course, the court could characterize the situation as an instance
330. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 364-65 (Lemmon, ., dissenting).
331. Id. at 365 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
332. La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13) (quoted supra note 306).
333. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 365 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 289-297.
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of unilateral error, or it could rule that the concept of inexcusable error can
encompass instances of shared error attributable to the fault of one of the parties.
If the majority in Scott regarded inexcusable error as a concept protecting
expectations even in the absence of reliance, then it would be expected to
approve the First Circuit's decision in Humphreys. If the only issue is fault
concerning the error's occurrence, then the insurer in Humphreys appears at least
as culpable as the bank in Scott. The insurer failed to confirm whether its own
insured had executed a document it regarded as crucial to the transaction, and it
issued a rider evidencing the existence of the desired coverage. The bank in
Scott similarly caused parties to conclude that their son had paid or otherwise
discharged their indebtedness. If it is inexcusable to trust a son to obtain his
father's signature in order to novate the father's existing obligation, it must be
inexcusable also for an insurer to issue a rider without first confirming that its
prerequisites for coverage have been satisfied.
Despite the similarities of the situations in Scott and Humphreys, it is by no
means certain that the majority in Scott would have approved the result in
Humphreys. As previously suggested, the situation in Humphreys can be
differentiated in that the insured, despite her perception that coverage had been
effected, should have known that this result required the acquiescence of her
husband's former spouse. Additionally, although the Scott majority makes no
mention of reliance in justifying its decision, it was discussing a situation where
nearly a year had elapsed between the parents' receipt of the cancelled note and
the bank's subsequent effort to rescind the cancellation. There was no testimony
that the obligors had entered any transaction they would not have entered if they
had believed the indebtedness to remain in existence; however, the majority's
decision could well have been influenced by the possibility of such reliance.
Also, it is likely that the passage of time at some point will incline nearly every
judge to deny rescission. Accordingly, the fact that the insurer's assertion of
error was communicated within several days of the delivery of the rider could
provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing the situation in Humphreys from the
controversy in Scott.
The First Circuit also identified inexcusable error in its 1991. decision in
Woods v. Morgan City Lions Club.3 5 In that case the court of appeal reversed
a trial court determination that there had been no "meeting of the minds"336
and ruled that the plaintiff had been justified in perceiving an agreement. The
court also rejected the defendant's contention that any such agreement should be
subject to rescission grounded upon error. The plaintiff's claim was for the
$10,000 "jackpot" in a bingo game in which she covered the last of the twenty-
five spaces on her card on the fifty-second number called in the contest. The
defendant, who had paid the plaintiff $1,000 as a consolation prize, asserted that
the jackpot game had ended with the fifty-first number. The plaintiff's position
335. 588 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
336. Id. at 1197.
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was based primarily upon the Lions Club's advertisement in a local newspaper
describing a jackpot game with a maximum of fifty-two numbers. Despite the
Lions Club's contrary contention, the trial court found that the terms of the
printed advertisement had been approved by a club member authorized to
perform that function, and the court of appeal affirmed this finding.3 The
appellate opinion does not reveal the basis of the trial court's conclusion that an
agreement had not occurred. In light of its determination concerning the
authorization and terms of the advertisement, its decision may have been based
upon testimony concerning announcements allegedly made prior to the
occurrence of the jackpot game.
The court of appeal regarded the advertisement as an offer specifying the
Tules to be utilized in the jackpot game on the evening in question. Under the
court's analysis, a purchase of bingo cards by a contestant familiar with the
advertisement "was sufficient to constitute acceptance" and resulted in "a valid
and binding contract, under which [the plaintiff] became entitled to the promised
rewards."33  In this view, any announcements concerning the rules of the
contest made after plaintiff's purchase of her cards were efforts to modify
contractual terms already in existence. 39 Although there was conflicting
evidence concerning the occurrence of announcements as to the duration of the
jackpot game, there admittedly was no effort to alert contestants that the jackpot
game would not be conducted in accordance with the terms expressed in the
newspaper advertisement. On that basis, the court concluded that "as a matter
of law the alleged notice concerning the number required to win the jackpot...
was insufficient to apprise the plaintiff that the offer expressed in the advertise-
ment was no longer valid." 40 In the court's opinion, the Lions Club should
have notified all participants, individually, of its intention to limit the jackpot
game to fifty-one numbers when bingo cards were sold at the beginning of the
evening.
The court of appeal then addressed the contention that any agreement based
upon the advertisement was vitiated by error. The court began its analysis by
citing Articles 1948 and 1949 and by emphasizing the latter article's provision
limiting legally significant error to assumptions that were known or should have
been known by the party resisting rescission. Without discussing any of the
factors that might have been relevant to the availability of rescission under these
articles, the court continued: "Furthermore, unilateral error does not vitiate
consent if the cause of the error was the complaining party's inexcusable neglect
in discovering the error."'' The court then cited the Scott decision and quoted
its language concerning the general inexcusability of easily detectable unilateral
error. It next examined factors that could have supported both a determination
337. Id. at 1199-1200.
338. Id. at 1200.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1201.
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that the club's error was not a basis for rescission under Article 1949 and a
conclusion that such error, in any event, was inexcusable. The court noted that
the advertisement covered half of a newspaper page and found that the record
supported the trial court's conclusion that the club was responsible for its
content. 42 The court also noted that the club members who oversaw the
contests on the evening in question were unaware of the terms of the advertise-
ment.343 Additionally, it observed that the schedule for increasing the number
of balls to be called in the jackpot game "was peculiarly within the knowledge
of the Lions Club, and this policy was never communicated to the public. 3"
The analysis concluded:
Because of these facts there is no way that plaintiff can be charged with
contributing to the error. Furthermore, the unique circumstances of the
case would naturally lead any person to assume that the numbers
changed every other week. Under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the Lions Club may not seek to void its contract with the plaintiff
for unilateral error.345
The court clearly concluded that the club's error was inexcusable. It is difficult
to determine whether the court also regarded the club's desire to limit the jackpot
game to fifty-one numbers as an intention without significance under traditional
error analysis.
Inexcusable neglect was identified as an alternative basis for denials of
rescission in Smith v. Remodeling Service, Inc.146 and Davis v. Rubenstein.17
In Smith, a 1994 decision of the Fifth Circuit discussed previously in this
article,348 the court concluded that a buyer's erroneous assumption concerning
the square footage of a home's living area provided no basis for rescission. The
court first identified factors providing basis for the rejection of the buyer's claim
under traditional error analysis. The buyer's apparent "motive" for buying the
house was identified as the acquisition of a suitable place to live, and the price
paid was said to be fair in light of the market value of the structure. 49
Additionally, the court noted the absence of any evidence indicating that the
seller knew or should have known that the buyers had been misinformed about
the size of the living area .3 " Accordingly, the court had clear basis for
rejecting the buyers' demand for rescission without regard to the existence of any
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error resulting from inexcusable neglect affords no basis for rescission,
observed that the purchasers "could have easily measured the residence prior to
the sale to determine the actual living area of the home."3" Thus, the court
seems to have regarded the buyers' neglect as an independent basis for its
decision.
In the 1988 decision rendered in Davis v. Rubenstein, 52 the Second Circuit
affirmed a trial court's finding that an investor had no right to rescind his
acquisitions of options to purchase silver. The investor contended that he had
not understood the effect that his subsequent agreements to extend the duration
of these options would have upon the price to be paid if the extended options
were exercised. The record showed that the investor had experience in
transactions involving stocks, commodities, real estate, and at least one prior
forward silver contract.3" The evidence also showed that he received confir-
mations showing a new higher price to be paid for the silver in each instance
when an option was extended.35' The court of appeal approved the trial court's
finding that the complaining party had failed to establish error. The appellate
court also asserted that any failure to understand the transactions resulted from
the plaintiff's inexcusable neglect in discovering the error and accordingly
provided no basis for rescission.35S
The concept of inexcusable error is considered in several other decisions of
the Louisiana courts of appeal356 and the Scott decision receives attention in
two cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit.3 Two of these decisions warrant discussion.
In 1991, in Adler v. Parkerson,358 Louisiana's Fifth Circuit affirmed a
judgment rescinding an agreement to purchase residential property because of the
purchasers' erroneous assumption that the property had been shored during recent
renovations. The trial court found that the buyers would not have agreed to
purchase the home if they had known that it had not been shored professionally
and that the sellers knew or should have known that the buyers believed that the
shoring had been accomplished." 9 The sellers contended on appeal that the
buyers were inexcusably negligent in failing to notice masonry cracks suggesting
the need for shoring and in failing to verify the occurrence of the shoring
351. Id.
352. Davis, 535 So. 2d at 812.
353. Id. at 814.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See, e.g., Durand v. Board of Trustees, 704 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); LeBlanc
v. Faul, 659 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Degravelles v. Hampton, 652 So. 2d 647 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1995); Adler v. Parkerson, 581 So. 2d 1073 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
357. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Land, Inc., 988 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1993); First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Twin City Say. Bank, 868 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1989).
358. 581 So. 2d 1073 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
359. Id. at 1075.
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services by consulting the shoring company believed to have performed the
work. 60 It was contended that Scott provided basis for denying rescission even
though the sellers' representations communicated through their realtor were the
source of the buyers' belief that the shoring had been accomplished by an
identified shoring company."'
The appellate court had no difficulty in rejecting the arguments grounded
upon the supreme court's decision in Scott. The court observed that Scott had
described inexcusable neglect in terms of easily detectable unilateral error and
had identified experience and expertise as factors to be weighed in assessing
culpability.362 In light of this guidance and in view of the realtor's testimony
as to her observations concerning the property, the court found that the
conditions indicating a current need for shoring were not easily detectable
by those unfamiliar with construction.363 Because the sellers, at a
minimum, should have understood that the buyers believed that professional
shoring had been performed, the court also rejected the sellers' character-
ization of the buyers' error as unilateral.3" Additionally, the court
asserted that a party "who has misrepresented the facts is not in the
position of the innocent party against whom rescission is sought for a
unilateral error. 3 65  Accordingly, the sellers' reliance upon Scott was
found to be misplaced.
In the 1993 case of lllinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Land, Inc.,366 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a contention that
inexcusable negligence precluded reformation grounded upon mutual error. The
court rejected the argument. It examined the cases beginning with Scott and
concluded that the recognition of contractual negligence as a defense to "actions
for rescission based on unilateral error" did not indicate that the concept "also
applies to reformation actions based on mutual error.""36 In support of its
conclusion, the court noted that the Louisiana State Law Institute comment to
Article 1952 concerning inexcusable error refers only to actions for rescis-
sion.368 Additionally, the court was unable to locate a Louisiana appellate case
recognizing contractual negligence as a bar to reformation in circumstances
where mutual mistake had been established. Furthermore, Meyers v. College
Manor,369 a 1991 decision of the Third Circuit, was identified as a case where
reformation was decreed in favor of a party who had not read the document in
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1075-76.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1076.
365. Id.
366. 988 F2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1993).
367. Id. at 1405.
368. Id.
369. 587 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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question. Finally, after noting that the Restatement permits reformation despite
failure to examine a writing,37 the court concluded that contractual negligence
did not preclude reformation grounded upon mutual mistake.37"
VII. A COMPARISON OF THE LOUISIANA LAW OF ERROR AND THE
RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS CONCERNING MISTAKE
A. Mistaken Assumptions
1. Article 1949 and Section 152
Civil Code article 1949 and Restatement section 152 have common
denominators. Under Article 1949, an erroneous assumption provides basis for
rescission "only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would not
have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been known to the
other party."3 '' Section 152 of the Restatement similarly recognizes a "mistake
of both parties... as to a basic assumption" as a ground for avoidance if the
mistake had "a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances" and the
complaining party did not bear the "risk of the mistake." '373
In most cases, the factors underlying a decision to grant rescission under
Article 1949 would justify the identification of a basic assumption that materially
affected the agreed exchange of performances. 7 Further, a decision to grant
relief under Article 1949 itself involves a determination that the complaining
party should not bear the risk of the inaccuracy of the assumption at issue.
3 75
For example, in the 1986 decision in Cochran Ford, Inc. v. Copeland,376 a
Louisiana court of appeal rescinded successive sales of an automobile because the
parties did not detect its classification as a "reconstructed" vehicle. The
reconstructed designation resulted from the vehicle's earlier involvement in an
accident for which repair costs had been estimated to equal at least seventy-five
percent of the automobile's market value. Under the pertinent statutory
provisions, such a vehicle must be designated as reconstructed on its title
370. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 157 cmt. (b) (1981).
371. Land, 988 F.2d at 1406.
372. See supra text following note 4.
373. See supra text following note 54.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 4-49, 51-79.
375. In order to provide basis for relief under the concept of error as to cause, an assumption
mustlhave been integral to the complaining party's expression of commitment, and the party resisting
rescission must have known or have had reasonable basis for knowing of the assumption and its
significance. However, not every such assumption is required to be recognized as a cause. In
determining the appropriateness of rescission, the Louisiana courts may weigh all factors affecting
the availability of avoidance under the terms of Restatement section 152.




certificate if it is repaired and restored to operation." The court concluded
that the unknown existence of the reconstructed classification affected "principal
cause" from an automobile dealer's "standpoint because the reconstructedvehicle
title decreased the car's market value and thwarted the dealer's ability to resell
the used car at a profit."37 Because market value was reduced markedly by
the vehicle's classification, a court guided by the Restatement should have little
difficulty in finding the parties' error to have involved a basic assumption that
materially affected the agreed exchange of performances. Similarly, a court
concernedwith the unanticipated disparity between agreed price and market value
would not be expected to allocate the risk of the mistake to the purchaser.
Because of Article 1949's formulation, it can be argued that any erroneous
"but for" assumption of a contracting party provides basis for rescission if the
other party to the transaction knew or should have known of the assumption and
its significance. Judicial decisions rendered both before and after the revision,
as well as revision comments, however, reveal that a party may bear the risk of
the inaccuracy of an assumption despite the other party's awareness of the
assumption's existence.379 For instance, in Boteler v. Taquino,M° a Louisiana
court of appeal refused to rescind the sale of a used car on the basis of its
involvement in two pre-sale accidents even though the buyer had sought the
seller's assurance that the vehicle never had been wrecked. The buyer had asked
the seller expressly whether the automobile ever had been involved in an
accident, and the seller had responded truthfully that he had no knowledge of any
such event."' The court refused to equate the seller's representation with a
positive assertion that a collision had not happened and ruled that the error as to
the occurrence of the accidents provided no basis for relief. 2
The court's decision also can be justified under the Restatement. Section
152393 identifies several bases for denying rescission. First, it could be
concluded that the erroneous assumption was not basic. Because the buyer
offered no evidence to prove the extent of the damage to the vehicle or the
alleged shortcomings of the repairs, he could contend only that he and the seller
had shared the assumption that the five year old automobile had not been
involved in any accident whatsoever. Even if a court believed this characteriza-
tion to be accurate, it nonetheless might conclude that the assumption was not
basic because some accidents result in only very minor damage and even
extensive damage many times can be repaired satisfactorily. Additionally, a
court following the Restatement could base a denial of relief upon the buyer's
377. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying texL
378. Cochran Ford, 499 So. 2d. at 512.
379. See Bilbe, supra note 6, at 900-02, 909-13 and supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
380. 517 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 174-
181).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 379-80.
383. See supra text following note 54.
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failure to prove that the mistaken assumption materially affected the terms of the
exchange. In the absence of any evidence indicating a difference between the
vehicle's market value and its contract price, no basis for rescission exists under
Section 152. Moreover, that section identifies anotherpossible basis for rejecting
the buyer's demand. Even in situations where avoidance otherwise is appropri-
ate, the section asserts that relief should be denied when additional factors justify
an allocation of the risk of the mistake to the complaining party. Section
15434 further addresses such circumstances and indicates that rescission may
be inappropriate where a party should have realized that certainty did not exist.
Because the seller was himself a recent purchaser of the vehicle and represented
only that he had no knowledge of any accident, a court could conclude that the
buyer should have recognized that he had only limited information concerning
the automobile's history. Such a conclusion would supply yet another reason for
rejecting the buyer's claim.
Some Louisiana decisions have regarded one party's awareness of the other's
assumption as basis for rescission in circumstances where relief need not have
been granted. For example, in the pre-revision decision in Carpenter v.
Williams,"s a court of appeal affirmed the rescission of an agreement to
purchase residential property on the basis of a change in circumstances occurring
after the contract was signed. The purchaser, who very reluctantly was preparing
to move to a new community to comply with a condition of his employment,
lamented his situation to the seller before the parties contracted to transfer the
property. After the agreement was made, the employer abandonedthe policy that
had required the purchaser to relocate his residence. The purchaser then refused
to go forward with the transaction, and the seller sued for specific performance.
The purchaser contended that he, to the seller's knowledge, was purchasing only
to comply with his employer's directive and that the elimination of this
requirement resulted in a failure of cause relieving him of his obligation to
purchase.386
Surprisingly, the court rescinded the agreement. The purchaser labored
under no error at the time the contract was made, and Louisiana's concept of
failure of cause did not require a decision conditioning the enforceability of the
agreement upon the continuation of his need for the property. The court
certainly would not have rescinded the transaction if a formal act of sale had
been executed prior to the employer's change in its residency requirement.
Similarly, there would have been no need to regard the purchaser's assumption
concerning his employer's policy as a ground for rescission if the employer,
unbeknownst to the parties, had terminated the residency requirement before the
purchase agreement was made. To the contrary, such an assumption readily
could be classified as an error concerning the purchaser's "motive" which
384. See supra text following note 100.
385. 428 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
386. Id. at 1316.
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supplies no justification for rescinding the purchase of an object having all
attributes it was believed to have. Despite the sympathies the purchaser's
situation might evoke, the agreement was not expressly conditioned upon the
continuation of the employer's policy, and the commitment to purchase very
reasonably could have been enforced according to its terms.
Relief under the Restatement provisions on mistake is limited to error
concerning circumstances existing when the contract was made. 87 According-
ly, the buyer's complaint in Carpenter v. Williams could not constitute a ground
for avoidance under Section 152. Any relief under the Restatement would have
to be based upon a claim of frustration of purpose. 8 However, if it is
assumed again hypothetically that the employer terminated its residency
requirement prior to the time that the agreement was made, Section 152 would
have application. According to its provision, a shared assumption may be
rejected as a ground for rescission on any of three bases. It can be found that
the assumption was not "basic" and thus that rescission is unavailable. Further,
even if it is determined that the assumption was basic, avoidance can be denied
either because the assumption did not have a material effect upon the agreed
exchange or because additional factors justify the allocation of the risk of the
mistake to the complaining party.
Because assumptions are regarded as basic only when they clearly affect the
terms of an exchange, a court readily could conclude that the purpose underlying
the buyer's decision to acquire the house did not involve a basic assumption.
Further, even if the erroneous assumption were so classified, rescission
nonetheless would require a material variance between the home's contract price
and its market value. Thus, rescission would be unavailable under the
Restatement's mistake provisions if the employer's residency requirement had
been terminated prior to the date of the parties' agreement.
2. Article 1952 and Section 153
Article 1952 possibly will be construed to afford relief in some situations
where the party resisting rescission will have had little basis for detecting the
assumption at issue. Article 1952's first paragraph provides that "[a] party who
obtains rescission on grounds of his own error is liable for the loss thereby
sustained by the other party unless the latter knew or should have known of the
error. 3 89 Earlier discussion has addressed the uncertainty as to the availability
of relief grounded upon a party's "own error" in light of Article 1949's
requirement that legally significant assumptions be known or knowable by the
387. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 152-53 (1981) (quoted respectively supra in text
following notes 54 and 79).
388. Impracticability ofperformance and frustration ofpurpose are addressed in Sections 261-72.
Section 266 concerns frustration of purpose resulting from circumstances existing at the time the
contract was made.
389. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 (quoted supra in text following note 4).
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party resisting rescission.'" Nonetheless, a comment to Article 1952 strongly
implies that relief in some cases should be available to a party who has agreed
to perform work for less than the cost of performance.39" '
It is possible, of course, to contend that the party resisting rescission should
have known that the other party believed his bid to exceed his cost of perfor-
mance. If this contention were accepted, rescission could be recognized through
Article 1949, and the erroneous assumption could be identified as the contractor's
"own error" under Article 1952. Accordingly, the party who unsuccessfully
resists rescission would be entitled to reliance damages. Prior to the revision,
however, the Louisiana appellate courts refused rescission in all instances where
the party seeking judicial enforcement lacked basis for recognizing the
occurrence of a mistake in price determination.39 Further, research has
identified no case identifying Article 1952 as authority for rescinding an
agreement that would not have been subject to rescission under the prior
legislation. Nonetheless, the courts may recognize the possibility of rescission
under Article 1952 on the basis of disparities between contract prices and
performance costs. If that step were taken, it would be necessary to develop
guidelines for identifying the situations that justify relief.
The Restatement identifies criteria for such determinations in Section
153.393 Under that provision, a contracting party's error in formulating the
price for services or construction is classified as the mistake of "one party."
Such an error provides basis for relief only when the "enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable" or "the other party had reason to know of the
mistake or his fault caused the mistake."
The Restatementprovides only minimal guidance concerning the identifica-
tion of agreements involving unconscionability. Neither Section 153 nor Section
208, the Restatement's principal unconscionability provision, defines unconscio-
nability. However, Section 153's comment asserts that some of the factors
considered in Section 208 determinations are relevant in identifying unconsciona-
bility under Section 151'" The comment to Section 208 relates that "gross
disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination
that a contract is unconscionable." '395 The illustrations to Section 153 further
indicate that the severity of the loss that would result from contract enforcement
can constitute unconscionability.
One of the illustrations describes circumstances where a contractor who has
agreed to undertake construction for $150,000 would experience a $20,000 loss
if the contract were performed by both parties.396 No information is given
390. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
391. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 cmt. (b) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 44-47).
392. See supra cases cited in note 204 and supra text accompanying notes 4447.
393. See supra text following note 79.
394. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. c (1981).
395. Id. § 208 cmt. c.
396. Id. § 153 illus. 1.
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concerning the size of the contract as a proportion of the contractor's business,
and the market value of the promised construction is not provided. The
illustration relates that the complaining party would have made a profit of
$30,000 if the contract price had been $200,000, the sum that would have been
bid but for the arithmetical error in computing the cost of performance. Thus,
where a contractor is destined to lose approximately 12% of his outlay, and the
contract that would have been proposed in the absence of error would have
resulted in a net return of approximately 18%, the Restatement asserts that
unconscionability can be found to exist. The Restatement's next illustration39
also involves a situation where a contractor's mistake in addition results in an
agreement to perform work for less than its cost. In this case the loss that would
occur as a consequence of performance would constitute approximately 3%
of the contractor's costs. Performance for the sum that the contractor
would have bid in the absence of error would produce a net return of
approximately 19%. The illustration concludes that the "court may reach
a result contrary to that in [the preceding illustration] on the ground that
enforcement of the contract would not be unconscionable, and hold that it is not
voidable."
The Restatement also considers the significance of reliance in
unconscionability determinations. The comment to Section 153 relates that
reliance by the party resisting rescission can justify enforcement of an
agreement even though "enforcement would otherwise be unconsciona-
ble."39  Even in situations involving significant reliance, however, the
comment asserts that avoidance should be available if a monetary award
adequately would protect the reliance interest of the party resisting rescis-
sion. 99
Article 19524°0 provides no criteria for identifying situations where
rescission can be awarded on the basis of a party's "own error." However, a
notion of unconscionability, despite its subjectivity, is probably the only
workable basis for restricting Article 1952's application insofar as it might afford
relief in situations where rescission would be unavailable under Article 1949.
Thus, Article 1952 could be construed to permit rescission of an agreement that
would not be rescinded under Article 1949 only when an unconscionable
disparity exists in the values of the respective performances. Further, if
an award of damages pursuant to Article 1952 would not afford adequate
protection for the reliance interest of the party resisting rescission, the
Louisiana courts reasonably might follow the Restatement approach and enforce
the agreement.4"'
397. Id. illus. 2.
398. Id. cmt. d.
399. Id.
400. See supra text following note 4.




1. Articles 1949 and 1950
Article 1950 enumerates instances where "[e]rror may concern a cause. 402
All of its categories of error were recognized also in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870.403 Because the comments4° to Articles 1949 and 1950 assert that
these provisions do not change the law, an earlier segment of this article
examined the pre-revision legislation and jurisprudence concerning the
significance of misunderstandings in contract formation."5 That discussion
identified several appellate opinions asserting that certain misunderstandings,
apart from the reasonableness of the parties' respective perceptions, preclude the
recognition of contractual commitment.' 6 In the case of error as to the nature
of the contract, error as to the contractual object, and certain instances of error
as to the person, it appears that pre-revision law did not permit the recognition
of contractual relationships defined in accordance with the understanding of the
party having the more reasonable perceptions.4 " In the case of less radical
misunderstandings, including matters that can be characterized as issues of
ambiguity and interpretation, the Civil Code of 1870,4"" like the present Civil
Code,4 recognized contractual commitments defined in accordance with the
perceptions of one of the parties.
The Louisiana courts have not had occasion to determine whether the
categories of error as to the nature of the contract, 410 error as to the contractual
object,4t' and error as to the person 12 have the significance that they had in
pre-revision law. In addition to the comments accompanying Articles 1949 and
1950, however, there is reason to believe that the former approach will be
continued. In the case of error as to the nature of the contract, the fact that one
party's perceptions are more reasonable than the other's does not alter the fact
that the parties do not intend to enter the same generic transaction. To hold a
party to a contract in these circumstances would eliminate consent almost
completely as a requisite for contractual responsibility.
The category of error as to the contractual object concerns a situation
analogous to the case of error as to the nature of the contract. Error as to the
object exists when each party thinks that a different item is involved in the
402. See supra text following note 4.
403. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
404. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 cmt. (a) and La. Civ. Code art. 1950 cmt. (a).
405. See supra text accompanying notes 9-47.
406. See supra notes 15 and 17.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 9-38.
408. La. Civ. Code arts. 1945, 1957-58 (1870) (West comp. ed. 1972).
409. La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-57.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
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transaction. For example, one party believes he is selling a particular tract of
land, and the other intends to purchase a different parcel. Here, as in the case
of error as to the nature of the contract, the recognition of a contractual
relationship defined in accordance with the perceptions of one party would
result in legal consequences radically different from those intended by the
other.
Error as to the person similarly may involve circumstances where the
recognition of contractual responsibility would result in legal consequences
markedly different from those contemplated by one of the parties. In this case,
one contracting party is mistaken as to the other's identity. Insofar as the
dichotomy between mistaken assumptions and misunderstandings,4 3 error as
to the person involves circumstances arguably fitting both categories. Because
the complaining party agreed to receive a performance from the party with whom
he dealt, his complaint can be expressed in terms of a mistaken assumption as
to the other party's identity. However, the situation also can be characterizedas
a misunderstanding as to the performance sought by the complaining party. In
any event, in pre-revision law, such error provided basis for rescission of certain
categories of contract despite the absence of any basis whereby the party resisting
rescission might have recognized that his services truly were not sought.
4 4
Further, error as to the person, like error as to the nature of the contract and
error as to the contractual object, may involve circumstances where the
performance one party intends to render is radically different from the
performance the other intends to receive.
The availability of rescission in all three of these categories is further
justified by Article 1952. Once more, that provision requires a party obtaining
rescission on the basis of his "own error" to compensate the other party for the
adverse consequences of his reliance.4 "5  Accordingly, in situations where a
misunderstanding can be attributed to one of the parties as his "own error," the
other party's reliance interest is afforded protection. Additionally, where one
party can be found to have been negligent in causing the other to conclude that
a contract has been entered, a responsibility for reliance damages can be
recognized under the Civil Code articles on detrimental reliance, 6 and
delict.417 In all cases where such compensation can be awarded to the party
413. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
415. See supra text following note 4 and supra text accompanying notes 38-49.
416. La. Civ. Code art. 1967:
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.




who relied on the ostensible agreement, a decree of rescission deprives him only
of his expectation interest. Further, this remedy relieves the other party of a
commitment he did not intend to incur.
2. Sections 20 and 153
Under the Restatement, a manifestation of mutual assent is a requirement for
contractual commitment. 4t3  Section 20 identifies situations where misunder-
standings do and do not preclude the requisite expression. Pursuant to that
provision, a contract can be recognized in accordance with the "meaning
attached" by of one of the parties if that party did not know of any different
understanding of the other party and the latter knew of the meaning attached by
the first party. Similarly, contractual commitment can be defined in accordance
with "the meaning attached... by one of the parties if... that party has no
reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other has
reason to know the meaning attached by the first party."4 9 The illustrations
accompanying the section involve variations on the controversy in Raffles v.
Wichelhaus,42 ° a case involving two ships named "Peerless" with significantly
different sailing dates. In each illustration, the parties, like the litigants in the
actual suit, express agreement for the sale of goods to be shipped ex steamer
"Peerless." According to the Restatement: where both parties intend the same
ship, there is a contract; where they intend different ships, and neither knows nor
has reason to know that they mean different ships or they both know or have
reason to know of their misunderstanding, there is no contract; on the other hand,
where one party knows the ship intended by the other and the latter party does
not know of the second ship's existence, there is a contact defined in accordance
with the latter party's perceptions; similarly, where neither party knows there are
two ships, but the first party has reason to know that the second party means one
ship, and the second party has no reason to know that the first party means
418. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981).
419. Id. § 20.
Effect of Misunderstanding
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach
materially different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other,
or
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning attached by
the other.
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the meaning
attached to them by one of the parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and
the other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
420. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
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another vessel, there is a contract defined in accordance with the second party's
perceptions.42'
Although a misunderstanding does not necessarily preclude contract
formation under Section 20, an agreement recognized under its provision is
subject to avoidance under Section 153 if enforcement would produce unconscio-
nable results.422 Thus, an illustration accompanying the latter section describes
a Raffles v. Wichelhaus variation in which a contract can be recognized despite
the parties' misunderstanding and asserts that the agreement can be rescinded if
unconscionability exists.4  Another illustration424 proposes an analogous
solution where a buyer agrees to pay $100,000 for property identified by a street
address under a belief that "this description includes an additional tract of land
worth $30,000."" The seller owns property designated by the street address
but does not own the additional property sought by the purchaser. The
illustration recognizes the existence of a contract but directs that the agreement
be examined concerning its possible unconscionability. Additionally, the section
includes illustrations identifying unconscionability as a basis for rescinding
contracts recognized despite one party's mistake as to the identity of the
other.426
C. Fault and the Availability of Rescission and Reliance Damages
1. Article 1952
The Civil Code articles concerning error do not contain any provision
expressly addressing fault either as a factor affecting the availability of rescission
or as a basis for reliance damages in situations where rescission is decreed.
Article 1952, however, implies that fault is relevant in determining whether a
party obtaining rescission will be required to compensate the other party for his
detrimentalrelianceupon the agreement. That article imposes such a responsibil-
ity upon the "party who obtains rescission on grounds of his own error" unless
the other party "knew or should have known of the error." Because responsibili-
ty for another's loss is recognized only when the error can be attributed to the
party obtaining rescission, the provision implicitly affirms that reliance damages
normally must be borne by the party or parties suffering them. Similarly, the
article suggests that its imposition of responsibility presupposes the fault of the
party obtaining rescission.427
421. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 illus. 1-4 (1981).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 84-100.
423. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 illus. 6 (1981).
424. Id. illus. 5.
425. Id.
426. Id. illus. 11-13.
427. The role of fault in determining responsibility for a party's "own error" under Article 1952
is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 38-44, 47-48.
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In some instances, a misunderstanding technically may preclude the
recognition of any agreement and thus the existence of a contract subject to
rescission under Article 1952. For example, error as to the nature of the contract
and error as to the contractual object could be found to have this effect.
4 28
Even if these misunderstandings prevent direct application of Article 1952, the
provision very reasonably can be applied by analogy to protect a party's reliance
interest when a misunderstanding can be attributed to the other party. Addition-
ally, the articles on detrimental reliance and delict can justify awards of reliance
damages where one party's fault justifies the other's belief in the existence of an
agreement.
29
2. Inexcusable Error and Section 157
In the 1987 supreme court decision in Scott v. Bank of Coushatta,43 the
majority identifies "inexcusable neglect" as basis for denying a claim to
rescission grounded upon "unilateral error." In another passage, this opinion
similarly asserts that "error on the part of one party may not invalidate the
agreement if the cause of the error was the complaining party's inexcusable
neglect in discovering the error."'" Because the transaction at issue occurred
before the revision's January 1, 1985, effective date, the Civil Code of 1870
applied to the controversy. However, the majority's conclusions concerning a
concept of inexcusable error are based primarily upon pre-revision appellate
decisions,432 and the opinion in no way suggests that its analysis is limited to
pre-revision controversies. Also, while the majority opinion contains no express
reference to the revision comment to Article 1952, one of the dissenting justices
refers to that provision in affirming the existence of a concept of inexcusable
error under the revised legislation.433 Furthermore, court of appeal decisions
involving post-revision controversies have cited the majority opinion in asserting
that inexcusable error bars rescission.434
The majority opinion in Scott provides only limited guidance concerning the
identification of situations where inexcusable conductprecludes relief. However,
the opinion refers only to "unilateral error"'43 and "error... of one party" '436
in describing circumstances where error may be found to be inexcusable.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17, 42-44. Although some instances of error as to
person can be regarded as misunderstandings that vitiate consent and provide basis for rescission,
these situations would not constitute obstacles to contract formation.
429. See supra notes 42-44, 48, 416-417 and accompanying text.
430. 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 289-318).
431. Id. at 361.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 296-308.
433. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 365 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 315-318).
434. See supra text accompanying notes 318-371.
435. Scott, 512 So. 2d at 362, 363.
436. Id. at 361.
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Additionally, the opinion asserts that error is apt to be found inexcusable if it is
"easily detectable, and could have been rectified by a minimum amount of
care."
437
Subsequent court of appeal decisions have not contributed significantly to
the development of the inexcusable error concept. Despite the identification of
inexcusable error in at least three of these cases, the opinions provide little basis
for generalizations concerning factors that might bar rescission. Further, in two
of these decisions, the absence of the Civil Code requirements for rescission
itself justified the enforcement of the agreements.43
Under Restatement section 157, "[a] mistaken party's fault in failing to know
or discover the facts before making the contract does not bar him from avoidance
or reformation... unless his fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and
in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. '439 The comment to
the section affirms that relief should not be denied simply because a mistake
resulted from failure to exercise reasonable care."0 The provision further
relates that "gross negligence"was rejected as a description of the degree of fault
precluding avoidance."'
The restrictions on the availability of rescission under both Louisiana law
and the Restatement significantly reduce any need to utilize fault as a basis for
limiting relief. Under Article 1949, a mistaken assumption constitutes a ground
for rescission only if the party seeking enforcement of the agreement knew or
should have known of the assumption's existence. Further, relief under that
article usually will not be available unless the assumption has had a significant
impact upon the terms of the agreement. When such circumstances are present,
the fact that an erroneous assumption can be attributed to the fault of one of the
parties need not be regarded as a reason for denying rescission.
In comparison to Louisiana law, there is even less need under the Restate-
ment to utilize fault as a basis for denying relief. Pursuant to Section 152,
avoidance is available only if a "basic assumption" shared by both parties had a
"material effect" on the agreed exchange of performances. In the case of an
assumption made by only one of the parties in circumstances where the other
party neither had reason to know of the assumption nor was responsible for its
existence, Section 153 permits avoidance only if enforcement of the agreement
would be unconscionable. In light of these- restrictions, the Restatement very
437. Id. at 362. The majority also states that "Louisiana courts appear reluctant to vitiate
agreements when the complaining party is, either through education or experience, in a position
which renders his claim of error particularly difficult to rationalize, accept, or condone." Id. See
supra text accompanying note 308.
438. See Woods v. Morgan City Lions Club, 588 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991)
(discussed supra in text accompanying notes 335-346); Smith v. Remodeling Serv., Inc., 648 So. 2d
995 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 348-351).
439. See supra text following note 126.




reasonably limits its fault-based preclusion to failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the differences between the Louisiana and the Restatement
provisions concerning mistaken assumptions, the availability of rescission in a
given situation usually will be the same under either formulation. Most
assumptions that have been recognized as grounds for rescission in the Louisiana
jurisprudence significantly affected the terms of an agreed exchange." 2
However, such an impact is not a requirement for rescission under the Louisiana
legislation," 3 and the appellate cases include at least one decision granting
rescission as a consequence of an error having no impact upon the terms of the
agreement.4 " In contrast, relief under the Restatement is available only if a
material disparity exists between the value exchange that would result from
contract enforcement and the value exchange that would have occurred if the
erroneous assumption had been accurate. 45  Significantly, however, the
Restatement holds open the possibility of rescinding agreements that do not
involve economic disparities through the application of its concept of frustration
of purpose."' In light of this possibility, the similarities of Louisiana's law of
error and the Restatement's avoidance provisions are greater than the latter's
mistake formulations suggest.
As previously noted, the Civil Code includes an article providing that "[a]
party who obtains rescission on grounds of his own error is liable for the loss
thereby sustained by the other party unless the latter knew or should have known
of the error." The availability of relief grounded upon a claimant's "own
error" '"7 is uncertain in light of the Civil Code's general requirement that
legally significant assumptions be known or knowable by the party resisting
rescission."' However, a revision comment suggests that there are circum-
stances where a party who has agreed to perform work for less than the cost of
performance should be entitled to relief."9  Accordingly, the courts may
conclude that some disparities between contract price and cost of performance
442. See Bilbe, supra note 6, at 943-45 and Cochran Ford, Inc. v. Copeland, 499 So. 2d 509
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 192-197).
443. Louisiana Civil Code article 1949 requires only that the error affect the complaining party's
"cause." See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
444. Carpenter v. Williams, 428 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 385-388).
445. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
446. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 illus. 9 (1981); id. § 266(2) (1981).
447. See La. Civ. Code art. 1952 (quoted supra in text following note 4) and text supra
accompanying notes 3847.
448. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949 and supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
449. See La. Civ. Code art. 1952 cmt. (b) and supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
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supply grounds for rescission. If this approach is taken, it will be necessary to
develop standards for identifying the situations warranting relief.
The Restatement contains provisions that could be useful to the Louisiana
courts in determining when rescission is available. The relevant section classifies
a contracting party's error in formulating the price for services or construction
as the mistake of "one party.""4SO Such error justifies rescission only when the
"enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable" or "the other party had
reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake."'" For the
purpose of avoidance under this provision, the magnitude of the loss that would
result from contract enforcement can justify a finding of unconscionability."
The Civil Code does not establish criteria for identifying situations where
rescission and reliance damages will be awarded as a consequence of a party's
"own error."" 3 If the courts conclude that certain assumptions provide grounds
for rescission even though they were not known or knowable by the party
seeking to enforce the agreement, difficult questions will be presented concerning
the requisites for relief. A concept of unconscionability, however, could provide
a feasible basis for restricting the "own error" provision insofar as it .affords
relief where rescission would be unavailable under the Civil Code's other articles
on error. Thus, an agreement not otherwise subject to rescission would be set
aside only when an unconscionable disparity exists in the values of the respective
performances.
In the case of misunderstandings, the differences between the Louisiana and
the Restatement provisions are more pronounced. The Civil Code identifies
categories of error that can affect "cause" including three misunderstandings:
error as to the nature of the contract error as to the contractual object, and error
as to the person.454 Although the matter has not received the attention of the
appellate courts since the Civil Code's 1984 revision, it appears that error as to
the nature of the contract, error as to the contractual object and certain instances
of error as to the person preclude the recognition of a contractual relationship
defined in accordance with the perceptions of one of the contracting parties.55
The inability to recognize contractual commitment, however, does not
foreclose claims for detrimental reliance. Such demands can be recognized on
several bases. First the Civil Code article permitting rescission grounded upon
a party's "own error" imposes a responsibility for reliance damages upon the
party who obtains rescission. 6 If any of these three categories of misunder-
450. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981) (quoted supra in text following note 79).
451. Id.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 84-100.
453. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 (quoted supra in text following note 4).
454. La. Civ. Code art 1950 (quoted supra in text following note 4). Error as to the person can
be classified both as the consequence of a mistaken assumption and as an instance ofmisunderstand-
ing. See supra text accompanying note 413.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 9-38.
456. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 (quoted supra in text following note 4).
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standing technically precludes contract formation, the article nonetheless can be
construed to encompass the situation when responsibility for the misunderstand-
ing can be assigned to one of the parties.4 Additionally, the Civil Code
articles on detrimental reliance45" and delict459 can supply bases for responsi-
bility where the fault of one party results in the other's reasonable conclusion
that contractual commitment has been expressed.
Under the Restatement, it is possible to recognize a contract in cases of
radical misunderstandings including error as to the nature of the contract, error
as to the contractual object, and error as to the person in Louisiana's scheme of
classification.4 60 A contract can be defined in accordance with the "meaning
attached" by one of the parties if circumstances justify the selection of his
perceptions over those of the other.461 However, a contract recognized despite
a misunderstanding is subject to avoidance if its enforcement would produce
unconscionable results.462
In the case of less drastic misunderstandings that can be classified as issues
of contract ambiguity and interpretation, Louisiana law, like the Restatement,
permits the resolution of controversies by the recognition of contractual
commitment defined in accordance with the perceptions of one the parties.463
In light of this similarity and of the Restatement provision permitting the
avoidance of contracts recognized despite misunderstandings, the differences
between the Louisiana and the Restatement approaches are less significant than
they initially appear.
The Civil Code articles concerning error do not contain any provision
expressly addressing fault as a factor affecting the availability of rescission.
However, a revision comment asserts that a court may consider whether error is
"excusable or inexcusable" in determining "whether to grant rescission or, when
rescission is granted, whether to allow any recovery to the party not in
error." 4 In decisions rendered both before and after the revision, Louisiana
appellate courts have identified the fault of a complaining party as a justification
for denying rescission.465 Further, in 1987, the Louisiana supreme court
identified "inexcusable neglect" as basis for denying a claim for rescission
grounded upon a party's "unilateral error.1
466
The substantial requirements for rescission existing under both Louisiana law
and the Restatement significantly reduce any need to utilize fault in limiting
457. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17, 4248, 427-429 and note 43.
458. La. Civ. Code art. 1967 (quoted supra in note 416).
459. See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 2315-2324.2 and particularly arts. 2315, 2316, 2323.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 84-100.
461. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1981) (quoted supra in note 419).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 84-100.
463. La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-57; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981).
464. La. Civ. Code art. 1952 cmt. (d).
465. See Palmer, supra note 307, at 27-28 and supra text accompanying notes 289-371.




instances of relief. In light of its restrictions on the availability of rescission, the
Restatement rationally limits its fault-based preclusion to failure to act in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. The
comparablerestrictions in Louisiana's law of rescission similarly reduce any need
for a concept of "inexcusable error." As a general proposition, judicial inquiry
should begin with an examination of all factors relevant to the possibility of
rescission under the applicable legislation. In that consideration, particular
attention should be given to the impact of the error upon the value exchange
agreed to by the parties. If such analysis indicates both that consent was vitiated
and that protection should be afforded to the party resisting relief, the legislation
very probably permits both rescission and an award of reliance damages. It
seldom should be necessary to recognize fault as a barrier to otherwise available
relief.
When the Louisiana law of error and the Restatement provisions on mistake
are considered in their entirety, the similarities outnumber the differences. These
common denominators are not surprising. At least for the purposes of contract
law, the assumptions and expectations of Louisiana's contracting parties are little
different from those of their counterparts in the rest of the United States.
Similarly, whether addressed in terms of error or mistake, all courts must balance
the need for stability of contract with the desire to protect parties to transactions
undermined by error.
Comparative examination of specific areas of law enhances understanding
of the respective provisions. When the provisions are conceptually similar, the
possibility of detailed comparisons presents particular opportunities. Such
comparisons yield additional benefit when they identify developments that can
be utilized in the compatible law of other jurisdictions. The similarities of the
Louisiana law of error and the Restatement provisions on mistake clearly
illustrate the existence of situations where Louisiana courts productively can
consider Restatement approaches as well as developments in individual states.
Similar opportunities exist for courts of other states to benefit from examination
of the Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence.
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